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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Jeffrey Wayne Timmons for the Master of Arts in English 
presented May 20,1994. 
Title: Theory and Poetry: John Ashbery's "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror." 
This thesis examines John Ashbery's poem "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror" and 
its revision of the traditional distinction between theory and poetry. Drawing a relationship 
between the poem's subject and the practices of postmodern theoretical discourse, the 
thesis posits the poem as an artifact of these changes. Creating a context for the poem, 
these developments not only inform the climate in which Ashbery's poem takes on 
significance, but, as well, explain the changing nature of literary study. Historical in its 
approach to the pressures and impulses within this climate of aesthetic production, the 
thesis traces the distinction between science and literature and how it has influenced the 
creation of the literary discipline. Demonstrating that the disciplinary study of literature has 
always been the subject of debate and discussion, it uses this understanding to place 
present disagreements about the need or usefulness of theory in the context of historical 
disagreements over the difference of literature from science or philosophy. 
Explaining that postmodern theory has largely worked to foreground the arbitrary 
nature of distinctions such as that between theory and poetry, the thesis elaborates on how 
poststructuralism undoes these distinctions to show how they are always the result of 
particular political and ideological views of representation. Using this critical insight, the 
2 
thesis then reads closely the details of the poem's relationship to postmodern theory, how it 
works to undo the distinction between theory and poetry. 
Having undone this traditional distinction, however, leaves the poem in an 
ambivalent and unstable position. Since it passes between extant categorical definitions its 
own nature remains undecided and, thus, maintains an engagement with and resistance to 
tradition. It remains caught between the need for the aesthetic past and the need for a 
freedom from that past. Chapter four, therefore, explores this ambivalence, particularly as 
it relates to the inheritance of romanticism and modernism. 
Finally, in chapter five, the thesis revises the main critical perception of Ashbery as 
postmodern, making a case for his closer affiliation with a late version of modernism. 
Because of Ashbery's preoccupation with the aesthetic past, his use of the imagery, 
insights, and idealism of our aesthetic history, he appears to re-create a distinction between 
high and popular art that is more consonant with a version of modernism. 
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Chapter One 
Science and Poetry: 
Disciplinarity and the Division of Knowledge 
Postmodernism and poststructuralism, as theoretical and aesthetic practices, have 
come to be a standard part of academic discourse. The critical debate that took place in the 
academic community concerning postmodernism, about whether it was something unique 
and distinct from modernism, was accompanied by anxieties and animosities raised about 
the growing interest in critical theory. The study of postmodemism and the theoretical 
models developed in order to facilitate this study were seen not only as a threat to extant 
curriculum and canons, but to the study of "literature" itself. Theory was seen as a threat 
because it had become more than a supplement or an aide in the study of literature; it had 
become an object of study in itself. Although these issues are still very much part of critical 
debate, at this point it is safe to assume that modem critical theory in the study of literature 
will continue to be a part of the academic landscape for the foreseeable future. 
While this situation is lamented by large circles of readers and critics, with some 
reasonable complaints about the rhetorical excesses of poststructuralist discourse, it should 
also be clear that the increasing use and production of theoretical discourse has opened up 
large new areas of research and investigation. It has also gone a long way toward 
reevaluating the criteria and bases of traditional inclusions and exclusions of texts--opening 
new avenues for study and providing alternatives to what has come before. In this sense, 
then, it has reinvigorated the study of literature and offered a new space for a diverse 
assortment of practices and methods of research that historically fell outside the discipline 
of "Literature." The large-scale infusion of theoretical discourse about literature has made 
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it possible to foreground the sorts of activities that we as critics and readers engage in. As 
Gerald Graff points out, what theory has made possible is the opportunity to include our 
students in the debates, in the on-going construction of the object of literary study. This 
self-consciously theoretical study of literature is a potentially more rewarding method of 
teaching than simply submitting to students a model of literature predicated on fixed canons 
which are seen as an expression of a timeless human essence. The discipline of literature, 
in other words, responding to the insights of contemporary theory, has attempted to engage 
itself in a process of re-evaluation and debate about the very terms and objects of study. 
This process of revision and interrogation is to be preferred, at least pedagogically if not 
professionally, to a discipline unwilling to examine its own premises. 
The emergence and rapid growth of theoretical perspectives in the study of literature 
since the late 1960s has had a tremendous impact on the study of literature as a professional 
practice. It has had an enormous influence on the ways in which we talk about literature. 
Although the changes that have taken place in the last twenty or thirty years should be 
viewed as part of a larger history of the institution of literature, we should not neglect to 
take into account the particular character of these changes. As Gerald Graff emphasizes in 
Professing Literature, the history of English literature in America has always been a hotly 
contested subject of debate. There has been and there remains disagreement and debate 
over the terms and nature of literature. The curriculum, notes Graff, has never been free of 
controversy and political debate, it had never been free from discussion about what (and 
how) literature should be dealt with in the classroom (8). The history of the study of 
literature is the history of conflict, and how those conflicts affect pedagogy and canons. It 
is, however, the organized and bureaucratic nature of the "field-coverage" model that has 
historically masked debates within individual disciplines from students. The tacit 
assumption behind the cloistered nature of debate, masked by a belief in the humanistic 
value of literary study, was that students should be exposed only to the results of 
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professional controversy and not to the debate itself. Thus, the curriculum, continually 
determined through time by political controversy and trade-offs that were excised from 
public view, was presented as a de facto structure free of political rankling and 
disagreement. This institutional attitude manifested itself in a static and isolated approach to 
literature, reinforcing the student's perception of literature as the study of discreet and 
stable "literary objects." In Graff s view, because "the courses in periods and genres did 
not address one another, teachers tended not to raise the question of what connections or 
contrasts the different periods and genres might bear to one another, what was meant by a 
particular periodization. . . . It was as if categories existed in order to make it unnecessary 
to think about them and to recognize that they were the product of theoretical choices" 
(Graff 8). The effect of this was an implicit agreement not to ask how various perspectives 
and views might be connected or contrasted; it also prevented conflicts from becoming part 
of literary study (Graff 8-9). This masking of the conflicts also deprived students and 
instructors of a valuable "means of situating themselves in relation to the cultural issues of 
their time; for students learn not just by exposure to individual instructors, but by sensing 
how the teaching aggregate hangs together or divides, so that to obscure these relations 
robs students of one of the central means of making sense of education and the cultural 
world" (Graff 9). 
Coming as it does in a period that is intent on foregrounding the ideological nature 
of literature, Graff s "institutional history" shares the critical impulse for revising and 
examining the ideals, methods, and categories inherited from the past in order to show how 
they were, and continue to be, the subject of debate and political interests. The changes in 
the study of literature since the 1960s have made projects like Graff s, which ask questions 
about the very nature of what it is we study when we study literature, a necessity. We no 
longer take for granted that literature can and does speak for itself, we recognize that there 
are always values and political interests being promoted in any act of reading, and this puts 
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us in the position of always needing to re-examine the exclusions, distinctions, and canons 
of the past. 
The traditional distinction made between science and literature, between the literary 
and the non-literary, is just such an opposition inherited from intellectual history. William 
Paulson, in The Noise of Culture, notes that the distinction between the "two cultures" --
science and literature--goes back to Plato, but takes on its contemporary importance with 
the development of romanticism during the nineteenth century (7-9). Exploring the 
genealogy of the modem university, Paulson shows how modem divisions of knowledge 
are the historical result of particular relationships between disciplines and texts. Beginning 
with the medieval universities, he notes that there were separate divisions but they could 
not be distinguished "by whether or not they accorded the written word status as an object 
of study. In all fields, knowledge was sought in texts. The arts, and in particular the 
seven artes liberales deemed most essential to education, were in a real sense constituted by 
the texts that made up their curricula" (5). Although the liberal arts were segregated into 
divisions that suggest a distinction between literature and science, says Paulson (5), they 
did not differ in taking texts as an object of study: 
Knowledge, in other words, was presumed to reside in 
the written works of those authors who, by their writings, 
had originated the arts and whom the institutions of learning 
thus recognized as authorities. The function of the author 
was to guarantee the authority, the truth, of what was written. 
(Paulson 6) 
It is during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though, that increasingly we see 
evidence from within "literature" of a division, of a distinction being made between the 
literary and the non-literary. As Paulson sees it, the growing unease with authority, with 
the auctores, indicates the early formation of a discursive practice coming to define itself as 
opposed to the textual or "literary-ness" of literature. Modem scientific culture begins 
during this period to claim "that knowledge resides in a kind of statement whose truth 
depends not on authorship but on the procedures by which it is made" (Paulson 6). 
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"Modern science," says Paulson, "shuns the traditional seductions of writing, the rhetorical 
powers oflanguage" (12). Having reached a consensus on how to proceed, science is free 
to pursue its ends in a standardized manner that emphasizes repeatability and verifiability, 
not uniqueness or style. There is no longer any reason to engage in what might be termed 
"literary devices" in order to express empirical data. As Paulson says: 
It is true ... that the rise of modem science profoundly 
altered the status of writing and language in the pursuit and 
dissemination of knowledge. Science changes qualitatively 
when it acquires what Thomas Kuhn called paradigms, 
recognized scientific achievements that define acceptable 
problems and methods, providing a generally agreed to 
conceptual context for specialized work. In the pre-
paradigmatic phase of a science, its practitioners often hold 
incompatible, competing views about the nature of their 
object and the methods suitable for investigating it. They 
argue for these views by writing books addressed to one 
another and to a broad, cultivated audience .... As a 
scientific community adopts a given paradigm, the status 
of writing changes. Given the agreement on the nature of 
the problems to be solved and the general methods for doing 
so, there is no need for lengthy persuasive arguments on 
fundamentals. An exchange of information in technical and 
formalized language replaces the writing of treatises .... 
Science, by becoming "paradigmatic" and thereby experimentally 
productive, becomes less literary, less written. (Paulson 12) 
It is against the growing influence of science, its discursive habits and ways of 
describing the world, however, that romanticism first offers the alternative of an 
"imaginative, autonomous, nonutilitarian writing" (Paulson 12-13). Literature, particularly 
poetry, became a voice for what culture suppressed in its mechanical and deterministic view 
of reality. Against this Newtonian world view, romanticism emphasized the organic nature 
of the individual imagination--from which our modem view of literature emerges (Paulson 
13). The poet's way of knowing and describing the world was opposed to that of the 
scientist's, because while expanding "the empire of man over the external world," 
according to Shelley, science also circumscribed man's internal world (Paulson 13). The 
manipulative character of Newtonian science, to the romantics, was equal "to the control 
exercised by a calculating society over the inner self of the individual. Life, history, human 
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thought and emotion--these cannot be understood on the model of a mechanical system, a 
detenninistic interaction of masses and forces" (Paulson 13). 
This articulation of the differences between science and literature, each reifying their 
claims to a form of knowledge vitally distinct from the other, can be seen as an early 
example of a disciplinary squabble. Science, in the eighteenth century, comes increasing to 
make claims for itself that formerly fell within the domain of literature. Science then 
begins to exert pressure on literature to justify its claims as a form of knowledge. 
Literature, in other words, is suddenly in the position of being forced to confront its own 
diminished disciplinary status. It reacts by turning in upon itself and theorizing about its 
importance, its vital place in the cognitive processes of man, as a different and still valuable 
means of expressing the world. 
This is precisely the sort of context within which we must consider the present 
situation of modem literature, its status as a discipline, and the concerns raised over the 
growing theoretical nature of the institution. Making a claim for literature's continued 
importance, the romantic defense of the poetic imagination was a justification of its claims 
on the attention of its audience. No longer answering the need for scientific knowledge or 
authority, literature defensively speculates on its own functions and purposes within a 
culture increasingly questioning its relevance. Marginalized by its status as "fiction" and 
having no body of knowledge it can call distinctly its own, literature cannot claim to be a 
separate and autonomous discipline. In tum, in order to survive, literature must construct a 
set of issues or aesthetics that it alone is capable of examining. This is apparent in various 
aesthetic developments in post-nineteenth century literature, particularly modernism, New 
Criticism, and poststructuralism, wherein each seems to be a response to the increasingly 
difficult position of claiming a role of importance for the artist and/or critic and text. It is as 
if the romantic realization of the need to justify the place of the artist in a world abandoning 
aesthetic models for scientific ones is continually replayed in different terms, but with the 
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same purpose: to defend aesthetics and the artist as having an important role to play in a 
culture placing that ideal under critical doubt. 
It is understandable, then, that literature has become so increasingly theoretical in 
the last thirty years--particularly as the ideal of aesthetics as a means toward salvation has 
largely been abandoned. Having lost this particular form of aesthetic idealism, literature is 
once again forced into the position of making arguments as to its importance, of justifying 
its claims on the attention of its audience, of identifying what it is that it does that is 
valuable, and creating a place for itself in the world. Of course, there are various points of 
view as to what that role is and should be. That is why the reaction within the discipline to 
theory is so important; because this divided response, both negative and positive, to 
modern literature's increasingly theoretical nature is itself a sign of the anxiety about what 
literature is or should be. The present debate within the literary discipline over the 
relationship between theory and poetry, about whether we need theory to discuss literature 
or not, between those who see theory as a separate discourse, recreates much the same 
sorts of rhetorical positions as the romantic reaction to science did. Now, however, those 
positions are staked out within literature itself, between those that feel literature is not 
theory and those that feel theory is vital for the continued presence of literature on the 
intellectual and aesthetic landscape. 
Paulson and Graff point out that literature as a discipline has continually replayed 
these sorts of dilemmas within itself. Literature as an autonomous discourse has constantly 
attempted to reconcile its uncertain status as an object of knowledge with its need to remain 
an object of study in the face of disciplinary incursions on its subject matter. The dilemma 
has had various incarnations, but remains a constant in discussions of what is or what 
should constitute literary study. As both Graff and Paulson claim, the introduction of 
national literatures into the educational curriculum during the nineteenth century is an 
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example of the presence of this dilemma early on in the history of the discipline. The new 
place in the curriculum for English literature was intended to promote not only the 
ideological and cultural values of society, but to serve also as an area of scholarly study and 
research. As Paulson says: 
On the one hand, the study of literature had to be made 
into a respectable university research specialty, one 
discipline among many; on the other hand, it had to 
assume the function of providing a general cultural 
education. Scholars and teachers were supposed to 
make literature into the object of a positivist discipline, 
imitating the sciences if need be, and they were also 
supposed to transmit the contents of literature, which 
were to serve as a synecdoche for the lost cultural 
totality that once resided in the written tradition but 
that was now disappearing as science disqualified the 
authority of the merely written in a growing number 
of domains. ( 17) 
The establishment of these dual functions within English as a discipline, Graff states, 
created a "crisis at the outset" in literary study at American universities. Because literary 
education found itself having to balance out scholarly and generalist conceptions of literary 
study, conflict was built into the institution from its very inception. This situation grew out 
of the establishment, in the 1890s, of an effort to standardize college entrance policies and 
to promote the study of English literature. In 1894, a national conference on college 
entrance requirements drafted a list of texts for preparation on the exams, a list that "not 
only gave definition to college English as a literary enterprise, but compelled the secondary 
schools to conform to that definition" (Graff 99). The problem, though, was that while 
attempting to consolidate English as a discipline, the adoption of the list demonstrated the 
conflicts inherent in its study. The 1894 conference is significant because it adopted two 
lists, one for the "wide" study and another for "deep" study. The adoption of two lists was 
essentially a compromise between conflicting points of view, between the adherents of 
"disciplined study" and the "proponents of appreciation," and "humanistic goals" (Graff 
100). Even here, notes Graff, at the outset of professionalization in the discipline, there 
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are conflicts whose sources lie in competing interests and values which make up English 
departments. 
The institution of literature, contrary to what is depicted in the classroom during this 
period, is made up of disagreements and conflicts over what and how literature should be 
taught. The discipline conceals the uncertainty about the literary object, as it finds less and 
less it is able to call its own subject, and responds with calls for professionalization and a 
more scientific approach to literary study. Unsure of what belongs to it, the study of 
literature also attempts to defend itself on the basis of a humanism, a complex of assorted 
moral and cultural values described as a "universal human essence," which actually cloak 
the interests and values being promoted as "universal." Thus, serving two contradictory 
impulses, the study of literature is divided between those that argue for its study in and of 
itself and those that advocate a more disciplined study. 
We can see these competing interests in the emergence of New Criticism. 
Emerging in its preliminary forms as early as the 1890s, New Criticism grew from a 
response to the work of research scholars who were seen as having divorced the study of 
literature from both its aesthetic and social concerns (Graff 122-128). The New Critics 
believed the research scholars did the study of literature a disservice with their emphasis on 
the historical, biographical, sociological, and psychological elements of literature. It was a 
method of study, the New Critics felt, that neglected works of literature by focusing on 
extrinsic matters. The success of the New Criticism's efforts to restore literature as the 
object of study was largely the result of a "united front" of nascent New Critics and other 
assorted camps, who eventually succeeded in marginalizing the more traditional research 
scholars. As Graff notes, these research scholars had come in for attack on all sides: 
from aesthetic formalists and humanistic moralists 
alike, since, arguably, they managed to sin in both the 
antithetical ways that offended each: that is, they confused 
literature with nonliterary forms of discourse and they 
divorced it from social and ethical concerns. Against 
this common adversary, which respected neither the 
morality nor the aesthetics of art, moralists and aesthetes 
could for the moment feel part of a loosely united front. 
(Graff 128) 
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Part of the commonality of this "united front" was the desire to make literature more available 
to the general reader by demanding attention to its formal features: the poem as poem, not as 
biography, sociology, or history. In this way, says Elizabeth Bruss, readers would be able 
to recognize the qualities of literature itself (13). In order to draw attention to the text itself, 
the New Critics emphasized the work of art as an autonomous whole and held that its value 
must lie within the text, not in extrinsic concerns. Distinguishing between what was internal 
and what was external to the literary work, rejecting extrinsic situations and contexts in favor 
of an internal analysis, the New Critics, according to Jonathan Culler, left both the reader and 
critic with only one option: they must interpret, they must show how a work's various parts 
make up its unity ("Beyond Interpretation" 245). Thus, the main concern for the New Critic, 
says Bruss, was to "define the nature of the literary object, and thereby establish which 
critical methodologies were appropriate to it and which were not" (11). Since the New 
Critics based their work on the autonomy of literature, on how different it was from other 
discourses, they regulated the accumulation of information about the text to an ancillary role 
(Culler, "Beyond Interpretation" 245). Although this gave the study of literature more focus 
and promoted a more precise and relevant understanding of literary works, it also implicitly 
made literary theory a negative activity (Culler, "Beyond Interpretation" 251)--because it 
limited the critic to showing how the parts of a text function and deferred to other disciplines 
questions about the text's history or its status within a culture. Indeed, for the New Critics, 
the worth of criticism lay in its efforts to protect the autonomy of literature from historical 
studies or science (Bruss 12): "If the work is an autonomous whole then it can and should 
be studied in and for itself, without references to possible external contexts, whether 
biographical, historical, psychoanalytic, or sociological" (Culler, "Beyond Interpretation" 
245). 
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The New Criticism managed for a time to control the conflicts within itself through 
its focus and attention to a "stricter, more principled, even "scientific" or theoretically 
founded, study of art" (Hartman 258). Defending their view of literary texts as an 
autonomous and distinctly different object from that of psychology or history, the New 
Critics sought to separate texts from their contexts. Believing literature to be a disciplinary 
object in much the same sense that history or psychology has a subject, the New Criticism 
saw the study of the internal organization of literature, as opposed to biographical or 
contextual study, as the most efficient means of protecting disciplinary status for literature. 
Stressing the peculiarity of literature, its difference from other types of language, New 
Criticism worked against attempts to subject literature to verifiability, to treat it as historical, 
or as autobiographical revelations by the author. The New Critics objected to these 
methods as trivializing the aesthetic experience of reading and ignoring the "specificity and 
integrity of literary constructions" (Bruss 11 ). However, with its prohibition on "ideas, 
psychology, social relations, and other extrinsic disciplines," the New Critics isolated 
literature from anything but itself, detaching and removing it from work in other disciplines 
(Bruss 13). 
The increased attention to internal order is most apparent in the New Criticism's 
practice of close reading. Arising from a need for a greater focus on the literary object 
itself--without the distraction of history, veracity, or practical value (Bruss 12)--close 
reading also distances literature from any relation to context or situation. In their efforts to 
impose restrictions on various approaches to texts and in attempting to bracket off literature 
(particularly poetry) from other types of language, New Criticism created a self-destroying 
conflict within itself: by imposing its own critical devices, New Criticism implicitly 
acknowledged that meaning was created, not as they believed, by the object itself, but by 
the method used to examine it (Bruss 14-15). New Criticism was unable to see the irony it 
had created within itself. That is, while promoting the reading of texts themselves, not as 
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biography or psychology or philology, the New Critics implicitly argued for theory as a 
way to interpret works of art. Thus, theory, in the shape of history or psychology, is seen 
by New Criticism as outside literature, part of another discourse, which only offers a way 
of talking about literature and not a way of talking about literature itself. But in arguing for 
their own "more scientific" approach to textual study, the New Critics argued for the use of 
theory, for the application of their method of examining texts. Hence, the contradiction that 
Bruss and Graff identify arises out of the use and denial of theory: when reading is seen as 
an activity, a strategy, or attempt to apply meaning to a text rather than the text determining 
meaning, reading is freed from "reverent responsiveness" to the literary object. New 
Criticism, believing itself to be "objective" in plumbing the text for meaning, actually 
exposes the manner in which meaning is created in a text by the critical method used to 
examine it. However, "the ultimate consequence of the 'decline of the object' is the 
liberation of literary theory to determine its own proper ends, no longer ruled by what the 
object itself seems to demand--a demand that ... always smacked of circularity, since the 
object was actually a product of theoretically imposed definitions in the first place" (Bruss 
15). In addition, notes Bruss, when form at last begins to appear neither determining nor 
determinant but itself dependent for its completion upon social and semiotic conventions, 
the way is opened for an assault on the dichotomy between intrinsic and extrinsic 
approaches to literature (15). 
The division and separation of science and literature, then, has shaped the nature of 
literature, even from within the discipline devoted to its study. Literature, having taken its 
leave of science, appears to replay the distinction made between them throughout its own 
institutional history. Within the modem discipline of literary study, the opposition between 
theory and literature still permeates debates over new approaches and methods for literary 
study. Although the debate takes on new character and form, it is a reproduction of that 
cleaving of science and literature, that distinction between a way of talking and a way of 
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talking about talking. This distinction between such apparently different modes of 
discourse as theory and poetry, between the object of study and the methods used to study 
it, are the very oppositions that our contemporary critical energies have come to bear on. It 
is also the context of John Ashbery's "Self-Portrait In A Convex Mirror." 
Chapter Two 
Postmodernism: 
Theory and Poetry 
I 
The idea of poetry is often contrasted with that of thought, and 
particularly 'abstract thought. ' People say 'poetry and abstract 
thought' as they say good and evil, vice and virtue, hot and cold. 
Most people, without thinking any further, believe that the analytical 
work of the intellect, the efforts of will and precision in which it 
implicates the mind, are incompatible with that freshness of 
inspiration, that flow of expression, that grace and fancy which 
are the signs of poetry and which reveal it at its very first words. 
If a poet's work is judged profound, its profundity seems to be of 
a quite different order from that of a philosopher or a scientist. 
Some people go so far as to think that even meditation on his art, 
the kind of exact reasoning applied to the cultivation of roses, can 
only harm a poet, since the principal and most charming object of 
his desire must be to communicate the impression of a newly and 
happily born state of creative emotion which, through surprise and 
pleasure, has the power to remove the poem once and for all from 
any further criticism. 
Paul Valery, "Poetry and Abstract Thought" 
The work of John Ashbery is frequently referred to as postmodern. His 
subverting, deflating, and leveling of language has been hailed as the embodiment of 
literary postmodemism. The bringing down of ideals and expectations, the reduction of 
language to a surface phenomena, and the mixing of high and popular culture all attest to 
what in Ashbery we consider postmodern. Ashbery' s identification as postmodern, 
though, obscures a problem in making such a distinction. All too often "postmodemism" 
becomes a catch-all term for anything that has happened since 1960, without taking into 
account more specifically what it might entail. When this happens, postmodernism is 
subject to criticism for having no well-defined characteristics of its own, of having a 
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parasitic or ill-defined sense of its own nature, of taldng modernism to its absurd extremes 
and, thus, as having no specific identity of its own. These "non-characteristics" are what 
constitute postmodernism. But it is as if the whole point of being "postmodern" were lost 
on those who only see a lack of originality or uniqueness. An important aspect of 
postmodernism consists in drawing our attention to the very process of how terms like 
"originality" and "uniqueness" condition particular responses to art. While this mode of 
aesthetic self-referentiality may be troublesome for some critics and audiences, it states 
quite clearly what postmodernism is: the problematization of rigid distinctions, boundaries, 
categories, and periods. Is it any wonder that postmodernism lacks in uniqueness or 
originality? These are the very ideas that it seeks to render problematic. 
Ashbery' s association with these postmodern impulses, though, particularly in a 
poem like "Self-Portrait," is too often a reactive and reductive critical gesture. Simply 
calling the poem postmodern conceals the poem's own ambivalence towards its status as a 
unique literary object. The poem stands in too oblique a position on the issue--will it or 
won't it be (post)modern? Not to examine its anxiety about itself is to overlook the poem's 
own explicit subversion of specific temporization and periodization. In other words, the 
distinction between modernism and postmodernism is exactly what the poem sets out to 
confuse. To call it "postmodern" is to say that it falls one way, when in fact it could just as 
easily be the other. What "postmodern" should suggest in its association with Ashbery, 
more than any clearly defined set of aesthetic practices or principles, is a suspicion or a 
hesitancy towards rigidly determined boundaries and distinctions. 
Ashbery's identification as postmodern is particularly interesting as it comes at 
roughly the same time as critical theory became widely accepted in American universities. 
This simultaneity is significant because it suggests a shared cultural paradigm. At the same 
time as Ashbery was writing poetry dealing with the difficulty of stepping out of the 
conventions that make thinking possible, critical theory was at work displacing the 
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traditional models, distinctions, and periods of literary study. Concerned that its own 
institutional history of distinctions and discriminations had been made at great political and 
social cost, literature saw theory as an efficient means for malting explicit the too often 
implicit hierarchies, exclusions, and values transmitted by language. While "critical 
theory" was not entirely "new," it brought about an important reorientation and an 
increased exchange between modem disciplinary divisions. This reorientation, a blurring 
of the distinctions between separate disciplines, has its counterpart in Ashbery' s own 
ambivalence. In both critical theory and the work of Ashbery, postmodernism turns 
distinctions into an object of interrogation, exposing them as the site of political 
contingencies and positions by foregrounding its own. Ashbery questions the poem as an 
"original" composition, questions its "autonomy"; the study of literature questions 
"literature" as a discipline, questions the claim to the possibility of "objective" study. By 
making readers and audiences more aware of the choices and exclusions that go into the 
making or interpretation of any work of art, postmodernism demands an awareness of 
those conventions that frame the possibility of response. That is, in compelling the 
audience to confront the constructed nature of a work, post-modernism demonstrates the 
arbitrariness of distinctions believed to be natural, timeless, or essential. 
The distinction that is often made between poetry and theory is a particularly 
important aesthetic and intellectual division. The distinction made between these seemingly 
opposed ways of talking about language is still very much part of the contemporary debate 
on poetry and poetics. It is a distinction still with us and frames the terms of the debate. 
Hank Lazer observes the presence of this distinction in his essay "Critical Theory and 
Contemporary American Poetry" when he asks: "What is, or what ought to be, the 
relationship between critical theory and contemporary American poetry" (248)? It is a 
question worth asking, says Lazer, because it has effects upon the shapes and practices that 
such oppositions create in the study of literature. While there is a great deal of inter-
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disciplinary work being done at present that can be seen as a result of the interest in critical 
theory, says Lazer, "there remain certain thorny oppositions within English departments 
and literary studies that deserve attention and questioning. Indeed, there are certain 
entrenched prejudices which, for the sake of both critical theory and contemporary 
American poetry, require some discussion" (248). Primary among these prejudices is the 
distinction made between theory and poetry, criticism and literature. These sorts of 
distinctions and divisions take on institutional shape within departments of English and the 
university as a whole in the way they distinguish between areas, genres, and periods of 
knowledge and specialties. Distinctions and divisions that exert their influence through the 
privileging (and deprivileging) of certain modes of poetry, as well as through the 
promotion of particular methods by which poetry can or should be taught. English 
departments, for example, reinforce the supposed distinction between creative and critical 
writing through their choices of teaching positions, specializations, and course content 
(Lazer 248). This intellectual segregation, says Lazer, even to those that question its 
institutional shape, remains largely unchallenged because of the institutional and 
pedagogical consequences of undermining the positions and hierarchies of literature as a 
discipline. 
Lazer notes that the enforcement of a boundary between theory and poetry on an 
institutional level is a repetition of Plato's banishment of the poets from the realm of serious 
thinking (249). The oppositions we have inherited from this distinction and its historical 
repetition have permeated our present understanding of the relationship between poetry and 
theory and prevent us from seeing the relationship between critical and creative writing in 
ways that might reveal compatibilities and areas of shared interest. The distinction sets into 
opposing camps the poets and the theorists, both of whom argue over who has the 
authority to say what poetry is or is not. The distinction, too, frames the terms of the 
debate; given that the theoretical is claimed by the theorists and critics, poets often argue 
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from a non-theoretical position. The anti-intellectual, anti-theoretical stance of many poets 
who argue against theory as a way of understanding their work is framed by the distinction 
between theory and poetry just as much as that of the theorist's assertions of "the death of 
the author." 
A typical example of the opposition between theory and poetry, says Lazer, is Karl 
Shapiro's declaration in the 1960 volume In Defense of Ignorance: "If poetry has an 
opposite it is philosophy. Poetry is a materialization of experience; philosophy the 
abstraction of it" (Lazer 248). Shapiro's attitude towards what he feels is a hard and fast 
distinction between poetry and philosophy remains common: 
Similar remarks can be found in the essays and interviews 
of poets such as Robert Bly, Louis Simpson, Philip Levine, 
and countless others. In "A Wrong Turning in American 
Poetry" (1963), a seminal essay for American poetry of 
the sixties and seventies, Robert Bly, while advocating an 
inward, spiritual tum in American poetry, takes potshots 
at the overly philosophical poetry of his immediate 
predecessors. He attacks Eliot for working up "the poem 
as an idea" ... and criticizes "the Metaphysical Generation," 
the American poets of the twenties and thirties, because 
"not only were these poets ... profoundly influenced by 
the English metaphysical poets, but their basic attitude was 
detached, doctrinaire, 'philosophical' .... " (Lazer 249) 
Negative reactions to "the poem as idea" are still very much with us, however, and 
still make up part of the debate on the nature of poetry and its difference from theory. 
Jonathan Holden, for instance, whose "practical criticism" attempts to separate the practice 
of theoretical criticism from poetry, is very much part of recent affirmations of the historical 
distinction made between poetry and theory. In his book The Fate of American Poetry. 
Holden shows how the professionalism of creative-writing programs has led not to a 
marginalization of poetry, but rather to the creation of a captive audience for it. Poetry, 
argues Holden, has broadened its audience within and through the university, used it as the 
basis of a popular audience (14). Holden's attitude toward professionalization and the 
poetry produced by it, though, is troublesome. While the university has widened the 
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audience for poetry, says Holden, it has also created what he feels to be a great deal of 
"mediocre" poetry: 
When an art form is produced en masse, most of it will 
conform to the fashion of the moment, be merely competent. 
But why feign surprise or disappointment in this? Mediocrity 
is present in every human endeavor. (Holden 14) 
What is clear in Holden's leveling of the charge of "mediocrity" is that some poetry, some 
types of poetry produced by "professionalization" are not what he considers to be good 
poetry. Holden is out to salvage what he considers to be good poetry, but in order to do so 
he feels he must sift through the vast amount of mediocrity produced by professionalization 
in order to find those poems that "could interest any serious reader, not just specialists in an 
English department" (10). 
Believing that professionalization has had both positive and negative effects on the 
production of poetry, then, Holden attempts to show why those poems he considers 
important are those that tell a story. Professionalization, according to Holden, has led to 
the dominance of the lyric mode of poetry. The problem with the dominance of lyric 
poetry, Holden feels, is that it marginalizes poetry from the lives of non-professionals (1-
7). Professionalization of poetry, says Holden, removes it from any serious claim to 
anyone's attention outside the university--especially in the form of the lyric which delimits 
its ability to speak to nonprofessionals in its renunciation of telling of stories (3). Holden 
argues for seeing the value of lyric poetry in its ability to tell stories that "struggle for those 
larger truths about life." It is the ability of the lyric to render a model of experience that 
makes it important to readers. The problem with Holden's view of lyric poetry, though, is 
not so much what qualities he values the lyric for as much as it is the particular values he 
promotes in his view. While Holden acknowledges the importance of the poem 
foregrounding itself as language, he values the lyric not for its formal features as a poem, 
but for its recreation of experience. It is a poem's suggestion of "the larger truths about 
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life" that give it value and importance, says Holden. Speaking of Brendan Galvin's "Seals 
in the Inner Harbor," Holden says: 
the main task of a good poem like Galvin's is to render, 
often but not always in miniature, a model of the structure 
of experience itself. What kinds of experience? Traditionally, 
the experiences are those of initiation, involving love, death, 
seasonal change, natural process. 
The rendering of structure, however, is not the only task 
that the "shortish poem" can perform. Let us look at a second 
"lyric." This one, by William Stafford, does contain ... some 
of "those larger truths about life the discovery of which is 
the final justification for reading." (Holden 6-7) 
What should constitute a good lyric, what constitutes a valuable lyric, according to Holden, 
is a focus on the "struggle for those larger truths" that are the "final justification for 
reading." It is not the poem itself which is the final justification for reading, but the way 
the poem recreates life and experience. Holden continues, in reference to the Stafford 
poem: 
If Galvin's poem needed little or no critical mediation, 
this poem needs even less. Its depiction both of the 
loneliness of pain and of its protagonist's moral courage 
is nearly overwhelming, and in sentences as memorable 
and wise as the most potent Biblical scripture .... 
(Holden 7-8) 
One should give credit to Holden's acknowledgment of the status of generic 
overlap, particularly as it relates to the prose-verse distinction, as well as to his recognition 
of the poem as a form of artifice that foregrounds its status as language. However, it is his 
continuing insistence on reading poems, in the end, as pictures of and reflections on 
experience that falls short and keeps him from any seeing value in lyric poems that do not 
"tell stories." Reducing poetry to the most facile humanistic criteria, Holden argues for the 
effacement of any critical act in the process of reading. Holden's expression of how both 
Stafford's and Galvin's poems need little if any critical mediation, as if they were as 
"memorable" and "potent" in meaning as the Bible, argues for an unencumbered, 
unmediated reading experience. In describing this unmediated experience, akin to what he 
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believes reading Biblical verse is like, Holden denies the role a reader plays in shaping 
meaning; he denies the mediation that must take place in the situation of being separated by 
time and place from authorial intention; and he denies the role a reader's own experiences, 
values, and history play in an act of reading. What is most suspicious about Holden's 
views, though, is that they attempt to promote a particular mode of poetry, a style that 
doesn't need critical mediation, and that speaks of those "larger truths" which, like the 
Bible, apparently do not need critical mediation. Holden's argument for an unmediated 
experience of literature is made in the belief that such an experience is possible and, more 
importantly, it promotes its own values, judgments, and practices of reading while denying 
their status as a way of reading. Couched in terms of an unmediated experience of 
literature, Holden denies that his own views of why poetry should be read are just as much 
bound up in a particular set of values as the most explicitly theoretical approach to reading. 
Holden's bias becomes increasingly evident in his chapter-length evaluation of the 
state of the poetic art, especially where he derides the production of poetry that seems, to 
him, made with theoretical explication and comment in mind: 
Wallace Stevens, whose meditative later poems are models 
for Ashbery ... has replaced Eliot at the head of the 
modernist canon; and various strands of High-Theoretical 
criticism ... have replaced the old New Criticism. Like 
the New Criticism, these newer approaches have developed 
their own specialized jargon and place heavy emphasis upon 
close reading of "texts"; but unlike the New Criticism, they 
have refused to take for granted any reliable relation between 
words and what they might signify. Stevens's approach to 
language--his poetic demonstrations of the ways in which 
language predetermines how we view the world instead of 
describing already known phenomena--has turned out to be 
almost tailor-made for critics interested in applying fashionable 
Theory to current poetry. (Holden 42) 
While there may be some degree of truth to the comments here, particularly since Ashbery 
has been over-used in displaying contemporary theory's usefulness, Holden's critical 
prejudice against the theoretical in poetry or criticism prevents him from finding any value 
in poetry that deals less with "telling stories" than with its own status as an aesthetic object. 
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His resistance to theory and theoretical poetry, though, not only repeats the historical and 
institutional oppositions and distinctions, but invests them with the imperative of protecting 
poetry from the theorists. The conscious effort on the part of poets and critics associated 
with postmodernism to bring our attention to arbitrary distinctions made between theory 
and poetry threatens Holden. He laments the apparent intrusion of theory into poetry, a 
situation in which he feels the poets lose out to critics. The implication for the dominance 
of theory is quite obvious, says Holden: "critics, not poets, are custodians and interpreters 
for all of us of 'our cultural heritage"' (44). Holden's comments are valid as much as they 
reflect changes in poetry, as they observe the overt intrusion of theory, theory-bound 
discourses, and hybridizations of literature and theory into the supposedly "non-theoretical" 
domain of poetry. But the problem lies in seeing any aesthetic production, including 
poetry, as "non-theoretical," and promoting that idea of poetry as the only acceptable 
model. There are always positions being taken in the choices and exclusions of 
representation; postmodernist theory and art simply attempts to foreground its strategies in 
such a way that the perceiver comes to recognize representation as the sum of conscious 
choices and exclusions. Telling stories, therefore, becomes more difficult when working 
from such a position, and more theoretical. To fault postmodernist practices for drawing 
our attention to the constructed nature of aesthetic representation is to fault it for the very 
same critical insights it is able to offer us. This is particularly important, especially since 
the hybridizations of theory and poetry of which Holden disapproves have given rise not 
only to the present debate about poetry, but, as well, to an increased dialogue between 
historically distinct divisions of knowledge. 
II 
The intensity of interaction and exchange between contemporary theory and poetry 
has largely been the result of theory's recognition of the importance of language. Sharing a 
preoccupation with the way meaning is shaped within the structures of language, both 
postmodernist theory and poetry draw attention to the devices of signification rather than to 
any inherent or natural meaning. It is largely because of this critical gesture that 
postmodern critical theory and poetry alienate readers and critics like Holden. Since much 
recent theoretical writing takes as its goal not "necessarily to clarify the meaning of a 
particular poem or poet's work" (Lazer 258-259), readers are often frustrated by its refusal 
of fixed meanings and by its excessive self-consciousness. Lazer suggests that this 
frustration is a response to the greater demands placed on the reader by theoretical writing, 
but to reject it for making explicit what remains implicit is to reject the very stuff of theory 
and poetry: language (258). Thus, what Lazer sees in recent poetry is also what much of 
recent critical theory has come to acknowledge as its own preoccupation: an awareness of 
language as the site and materials for the creation of meaning. Having a common 
understanding of language as providing the material basis for the construction of meaning, 
then, postmodern theory and poetry no longer need to be in a necessarily antagonistic 
relationship. As Lazer points out, not only do postmodern theory and poetry acknowledge 
their status as language, they also indicate how all constructions of language are subject to 
its processes. "If there is a degree of arbitrariness and play built into language, if words do 
not adequately name or represent things, then not just poetry but philosophy too is subject 
to this imprecision," says Lazer (261). This self-conscious attention to the conditions and 
materials of language in postmodern theory and poetry has made both less concerned with 
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rigid distinctions between them, since both take as their subject the processes of 
representation within language. This view of language as a location for the construction of 
meaning, how all creations within it are subject to its processes, provides a shared 
paradigm for poets and philosophers and subverts the distinction between theory and 
poetry (Lazer 261). Both acknowledge the arbitrariness of the distinction between them. 
Valery suggests in this chapter's epigraph that the distinction between poetry and 
abstract thought is one that seems quite natural and valid to us (52). Coming after the 
Romantics, it is understandable that we see literature, particularly poetry, as an autonomous 
and quite different way of describing the world than that of science or philosophy. Valery 
points out, though, that this distinction may have more to do with "scholarly" 
categorization and segregation of the Platonic sort than it does any clear and real difference 
between the two (52-53). Instead, he says, the distinction is the likely result of an 
antithesis adopted without reflection and repeated so often that it finds itself firmly fixed in 
our minds. Valery' s subsequent undoing of the distinction between poetry and abstract 
thought, however, rests on the observation that all discourse, whether poetry or science, 
philosophy or drama, uses a language that undermines the fixity of meaning we attribute to 
it: 
Each and every word that enables us to leap so rapidly 
across the chasm of thought, and to follow the prompting 
of an idea that constructs its own expression, appears to 
me like one of those light planks which one throws across 
a ditch or mountain crevasse and which will bear a man 
crossing it rapidly. But he must pass without weighing on 
it, without stopping--above all, he must not take it into his 
head to dance on the slender plank to test its resistance .... 
We must not lay stress upon them, or we shall see the clearest 
discourse dissolve into enigmas and more or less learned 
illusions. (Valery 55-56) 
The meanings and distinctions that are constructed within language are part of a system that 
allows its use only as long as its terms are not made to stand for something concrete 
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and solid. The distinction, then, that has been constructed between abstract thought and 
poetry is an opposition that does not hold up to intense interrogation, since both are 
phenomena of a language-system whose distinctions are subject to contingency and 
tenuousness. 
Valery' s observations about language being a system whose structure is built upon 
contingency and tenuousness is much the same view that dominates critical perspectives 
within postmodemism. Operating as it does from this critical observation, postmodemism 
and poststructuralism seek to undo the sorts of oppositions and distinctions that have been 
inherited from intellectual history and to show how these "discriminations" have been used 
to reinforce certain cultural values as "natural." Pointing out that poststructuralism is 
characterized by its attention to language as a site for the construction of meaning, Jonathan 
Culler stresses that poststructuralism bases its critique on a model that puts to work 
linguistic rather than thematic or historical methodologies. Poststructuralism' s most 
distinguishing habit, though, is its blurring of the distinction between what one has to say 
and the tools one has to say it with. That is, according to Culler, poststructuralism is not 
so much post-structuralist because it refutes the claims of structuralism or notes the waning 
of interest in structuralism; rather, a post-structuralist account is one that takes the position 
that there is no place outside of a cultural practice to describe that practice from. 
Poststructuralism, according to Culler: 
is a critique of a particular account of the structuralist 
project, the view that one was positioning oneself outside 
a cultural practice and describing its rules and norms. It 
is a critique of the view that could get outside and above 
a domain one was describing. The term poststructuralism 
would thus most accurately be used to designate the claim 
that structuralist analyses are caught up in the processes 
and mechanisms they are analyzing. ("Poststructuralist 
Criticism" 173) 
Poststructuralism, then, is that "analytic posture" that acknowledges not a scientific 
detachment from what it purports to describe, but, instead, one of involvement. The 
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method used to study an object, according to poststructuralism, does not provide a meta-
language through which one would be able to objectively describe that object; the method 
or habit of language used to describe an object is "problematically caught up in the 
processes and functions of the phenomena it is studying" (Culler, "Poststructuralist 
Criticism" 173). 
The lack of a metalanguage in the poststructural perspective is important because it 
recognizes an essential "literariness" within language. There is no language to talk 
"objectively" about the construction of meaning since meaning is constructed within 
language and language contains a "literariness" that is part of all human sentences--whether 
they are theoretical or literary, poetic or philosophical, novelistic or journalistic. Language 
is literary or figurative always already, because what language refers to is not something 
outside of it but within its structure. There are only deferrals and displacements within the 
system and no absolute position outside of it in which to speak non-figuratively. There is 
no meta anything, only the material of language to be worked with. As Culler puts it: 
"Philosophical enquiry also demonstrates the inescapable centrality of figurative language: 
the very attempt to separate literal from figurative depends on concepts which themselves 
are scarcely free of rhetorical qualities ... " ("Poststructuralist Criticism" 168). Thus, like 
Valery' s undoing, poststructuralism' s undoing of the distinction between the literal and the 
figurative fixes its attention on the necessity of the interrelation of such terms as literal and 
figurative in discursive operations. As Culler points out, the desire to separate the literal 
from the figurative is dependent upon language, which never makes present what it refers 
to, and so is always already figurative, and, thus, literary. 
Culler believes that the increasing interconnection among academic disciplines has 
been the direct result of recognizing the linguistic nature of the construction of meaning 
("Poststructuralist Criticism" 168). The greater interaction across disciplines 
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has provided the development of an "expanded rhetoric," a rhetoric which allows a "study 
of textual structures and strategies in their relations to systems of signification and to 
human subjects" (Culler, "Poststructuralist Criticism" 169). In other words, the exchange 
between disciplines has made a wider vocabulary available to all fields of study and has 
done so by opening interpretive doors with the understanding of the textual/verbal nature of 
the construction of meaning. In fact, as Culler points out, this also provides a sense of 
unity in the theoretical/critical enterprise as it is now practiced; for if the canon no longer 
provides a clear basis for the literary field--since the various theoretical views have 
constructed alternative canons--a sense of unity among various perspectives emerges from 
their attention to the mechanisms of making meaning (Culler, "Poststructuralist Criticism" 
169). As Culler notes, criticism and theory are now considered "the science of literature or 
more generally of discourses not devoted to interpreting texts but to investigating the 
conditions of meaning, the rules and conventions that make meanings possible. 
("Poststructuralist Criticism" 172). 
" 
Noting how the expanded rhetoric of criticism and theory has come to dominate 
academic discourse, providing a means for greater interaction and exchange among 
disciplines, Richard Rorty calls this development the "linguistic tum." The "linguistic 
tum," says Rorty, emphasizes that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that only 
sentences can be true or false, and that "human beings make truths by making languages in 
which to phrase sentences" (Rorty 9). Truth, thus, cannot exist independently of human 
minds; it cannot be "out there" independent of the human mind which thinks in sentences 
because, says Rorty, sentences cannot exist "out there": "The world is out there, but 
descriptions of the world are not. Only descriptions of the world can be true or false. The 
world on its own--unaided by the describing activities of human beings--cannot" (Rorty 
5). Sharing this view of language, separate divisions of knowledge now have a means by 
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which to negotiate their differences. Understanding language as the material within which 
we construct meaning, Rorty argues that this creates the possibility of a "passing theory," 
an intermediary discourse able to negotiate the differences between opposing vocabularies 
without eliminating them or subsuming them to each other. Believing that it is no longer in 
our best interest to replay the traditional oppositions and distinctions of the past, Rorty 
suggests that we not see as "opposed" different varieties of discourse and their separate 
vocabularies. In praise of the philosophers and writers he finds most useful, Rorty 
believes their importance is precisely their dissolving of inherited oppositions rather than 
solving them. In doing away with the need to see oppositions as needing reconciliation or 
synthesis, we cease to see in opposition the terms and competing vocabularies that form 
such distinctions. To continue to see these terms as opposed is to posit some position that 
could encompass both and cancel their difference. On the contrary, says Rorty : 
if we were able to bring ourselves to accept the fact that 
no theory about the nature of Man or Society or Rationality, 
or anything else, is going to synthesize Nietzsche with 
Marx or Heidegger with Habermas, we could begin to 
think of the relation between writers ... as being like the 
relation between two kinds of tools--as little in need of 
synthesis as are paint-brushes and crowbars. . . . Both 
are right, but there is no way to make both speak a single 
language. (xiv-xv) 
Rorty makes it possible, then, to abandon the need to see the difference between theory and 
poetry as needing to be reconciled or synthesized. Both terms are a necessary part of any 
discourse and both are useful for different purposes, argues Rorty, and therefore make it 
possible to evaluate in alternative terms the contributions opposing vocabularies create. 
Rather than simply bringing opposed arguments together in hope of a synthesis--which 
Rorty says is consonant with the view that there is a single truth to be expressed (xvi)--
Rorty is able to affirm various sorts of "literary" activities as offering insights as equally 
relevant as those of science or philosophy. In turning away from the need to 
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reconcile competing vocabularies into a single one, we are able to account for the 
differences that make them up rather than doing away with them. As Rorty says: 
Such a tum would be emblematic of our having given up 
the attempt to hold all the sides of our life in a single 
vision, to describe them with a single vocabulary. It 
would amount to a recognition of what ... I call the 
"contingency of language" --the fact that there is no 
way to step outside the various vocabularies we have 
employed and find a metavocabulary which somehow 
takes account of all possible vocabularies, all possible 
ways of judging and feeling. (xvi) 
Instead of positing a single vocabulary that would cancel the differences between 
competing vocabularies, Rorty argues for a "passing theory," a provisional vocabulary that 
is constructed in order to negotiate the differences between vocabularies: 
Think of such a theory as part of a larger "passing theory" 
about [another] person's total behavior--a set of guesses 
about what she will do under what conditions. Such a 
theory is "passing" because it must constantly be corrected 
to allow for mumbles, stumbles, malapropisms, metaphors, 
tics, seizures, psychotic symptoms, egregious stupidity, 
strokes of genius, and the like .... To say that we come 
to speak the same language is to say ... that we tend to 
converge on passing theories. [All] two people need, if 
they are to understand one another through speech, is the 
ability to converge on passing theories from utterance to 
utterance. (Rorty 14) 
Thus, a distinction such as that between theory and poetry, is one that is negotiable by a 
"passing theory," a theory that attempts to establish some sort of communication between 
speakers of different vocabularies without canceling the differences that have hitherto 
existed between them. 
Using the idea of a "passing theory," Rorty's readings of various "literary" and 
"philosophical" writers derives from the poststructuralist account of language and bridges 
what might be seen as a gap in the vocabularies of theory and literature. It is a passing 
theory, an expanded rhetoric, which undoes the traditional distinctions and oppositions 
between them in order to reinscribe their differences in an altered form. As Rorty's 
discussion of Derrida makes clear, what appeals to him is not so much the literary or 
30 
philosophical quality of a work such as La Carte Postale. but the way in which the work 
exceeds the criteria of either categorical opposition. It simply doesn't pay us to use the 
distinctions "literary" and "philosophical" in order to talk about such a text. As Rorty says 
about La Carte Postale: 
is it to be judged by 'literary' rather than 'philosophical' 
criteria? No ... because there are no antecedently available 
criteria of either sort. The more original a book or a kind 
of writing is, the more unprecedented, the less likely we are 
to have criteria in hand, and the less point there is in trying 
to assign it to a genre. (135) 
Not only is the difference between literal and figurative undermined to show how all 
discourses partake of the "literariness" of language, but, also, the difference between 
literature and philosophy is negotiated by the recognition of how these categorizations are 
arbitrarily agreed upon and have no "absolute" criteria that keep them at a safe distance 
from each other. A "passing theory," then, is one that undoes the distinctions to allow an 
increased exchange between them. That is, while maintaining that literature and theory are 
different discourses and cannot be subsumed by the other or to another discourse that 
would contain them, Rorty also holds that a "passing theory" allows communication 
between them, allows the construction of discourses that exceed judgments based on 
oppositional criteria: is it literature or is it theory? This, says Rorty, is a question that may 
no longer be of much use to us. 
In various ways, then, Rorty, Culler, Lazer, and Valery all suggest that the 
relationship between poetry and theory is not only an opposition that has come to seem 
fixed to us as a result of intellectual reinforcement, but one that in the postmodern era has 
come under suspicion on the basis of its construction as and within language. Given that 
theory has no recourse to a metalanguage to talk about poetry, it is in the same position as 
poetry--it must use the same resources in order to construct meaning. Postmodern theory, 
having recognized the linguistic nature of the construction of meaning, works to 
demonstrate this principle by becoming "literary" itself, by blurring the lines between 
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literature and theory, between poetic discourse and critical reflection. And in John 
Ashbery's case, poetry blurs the line between itself and theory. 
Chapter Three 
"Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror": 
Passing Between Theory and Poetry 
Using Rorty's idea of a "passing theory," we can now examine more closely the 
relationship between the concerns of postmodernism and Ashbery's long poem "Self-
Portrait in a Convex Mirror." A "passing theory" will allow us to negotiate the interaction 
of postmodern theory and contemporary poetic discourse and the effacement of the rigid 
differences between them. Using as our guide postmodernism's revision of representation 
and language, this section will explore how Ashbery works with these ideas and will show 
how his treatment of them shares the postmodern climate. 
Several key poststructuralist concepts occur in Ashbery' s "Self-Portrait," among 
which the most important are those concerning language and representation. Post-
structuralism has taken as its main focus the critique of the view of language (especially 
written language) as a fallen copy of the transcendental signified--the ideal meaning that is 
only partially and incompletely indicated by the copy that is language and writing. 
Language, then, as a system of representation, comes to be seen by poststructuralism not 
as an expression of some transcendental meaning, but as representing representation itself. 
That is, rather than seeing the purpose of language and representation as the expression of 
some idealized essence or contact with the divine, poststructuralism attempts to valorize the 
materials of representation itself; the signifier takes precedence over the signified. Post-
structuralism attempts to recover language and writing not as a medium expressing the 
transcendental, but as the material of consciousness itself. As was pointed out earlier, the 
attention given to the linguistic structuring of consciousness is part of an interrelated 
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complex of ideas that emanate from poststructuralism' s view of language. Starting from 
the position that language is an arbitrarily agreed upon set of conventions with no necessary 
relation between the word and the thing it refers to, poststructuralism extends this 
conception to reevaluate not only language, but also knowledge, the ability to know, and 
the knower who forms a self within language. Emphasizing how meaning resides in 
chains of signification, in the systems of representation built on differences, and not within 
a single stable point of reference or origin which would guarantee meaning, post-
structuralism argues that consciousness created within language is not a stable phenomena, 
but one bound up with the processes of language. The notion of the "subject," in other 
words, is undermined. Subjectivity becomes more the product of the signs used to discuss 
and indicate it than some transcendental essence that eludes representation. Most 
importantly, though, is the impossibility of a meta-language. There is no language or 
theory available to us, according to poststructuralism, that offers us an unproblematic 
medium through which to analyze an object of study. The perspective used to examine an 
object is as caught up in the problems of representation as the object itself. This lack of a 
metalanguage means that there is no escaping the systems of signification which prevent 
stability and certainty, no way of positing a transcendental ideal except as a construction 
within language always subject to displacement and deferral. Theory, then, becomes as 
bound up in language as poetry. Any positing of a radical and unalterable distance or 
difference between them cannot be upheld since the distinction itself is dependent upon 
notions of figural and literal usage that are themselves figurative. Theory and poetry are 
not two completely separate and distinct acts of knowing and saying, they are both 
language, both acts within language. In fact, as Ashbery suggests, the bringing together of 
poetic act and critical reflection in a single process in the poem is an effective strategy for 
the undoing of the distinction between them. 
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Language for the poststructuralist, then, is a system of representation that never 
guarantees the presence of the thing referred to. There is never a single expressible relation 
between signifier/signified, only the possibility of further reference that has no consolation of 
finality. As a means of representation, language does not guarantee the stability of ideas such 
as self, author, or origins. In fact, language guarantees their instability. Consciousness, 
subjectivity, the individual, the self, are all the result, all effects of language, of 
representations made possible by language; and since language is a system of internal 
differences never offering any stability of reference, always already deferred, the idea of 
subjectivity as a locus of identity or knowledge is problematized. In their essay "Theory 
Pedagogy Politics: The Crisis of 'The Subject' in the Humanities," Mas 'ud Zavarzadeh and 
Donald Morton state that in the postmodern view the subject is less the instigator of meaning 
than "the effect of intersections of meaning generating signs" (5). It is within and through 
language that the subject constitutes themself, because it is language alone that establishes the 
concept of an ego. But since language is built on difference, consciousness of self only 
becomes possible if it is experienced by contrast (Zavarzadeh and Morton 5). Thus, 
difference becomes the basis of identity, but also prevents any positing of fixity since the 
arbitrary signs of language never have a one-to-one correspondence with any absolute 
referent. The subject is not the sign of man's timeless nature, but a network of connections 
and significations: 
(post)modem critical theory does not conceptualize the 
subject as a stable entity but argues that the parameters 
of the subject vary according to the current discursive 
practices in any historical moment. In this view, the 
human does not possess a timeless essence, a consciousness 
that place him beyond historical and political practices; 
rather, he is considered to be produced by these practices 
or as an effect of these discourses. (Zavarzadeh and Morton 5) 
Self or subjectivity is not so much a timeless human essence, then, but a verbal construct. 
Michel Foucault argues the same point in The Order of Things. emphasizing that man is a 
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recent invention, that consciousness is a by-product of the historical codifications of 
knowledge, and that "man" will likely disappear when that knowledge finds another form: 
If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, 
if some event of which we can at the moment do no more 
than sense the possibility--without knowing either what its 
form will be or what it promises--were to cause them to 
crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end 
of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that 
man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge 
of the sea. (Foucault 387) 
Subjectivity is the product of language, in other words, and the development of 
consciousness into present forms is due to the emergence of particular linguistic patterns. 
The continual change of linguistic patterns, as well, may give rise to new forms of 
consciousness. 
The association Foucault makes between language change and modes of 
subjectivity is an important one for poststructuralism. Because consciousness and 
subjectivity are "no longer a privileged source of order," states John Johnston, they have 
"been pre-empted by a more direct concern with language as a field of endless articulations" 
(140-141). Language and writing, in the postmodern, are a site where rather than the 
timeless essence of the self is discovered or revealed, subjectivity endlessly takes its forms 
in the rearticulations of writing itself. "Hence the conventions, assumptions and strategies 
of writing as such are much more important for the postmodernist, for whom language is 
no longer the idealistic and expressive medium of a re-existing consciousness or ego, but a 
material part of the world ... " (Johnston 141). Instead of depth, writing and language 
proliferate alternative surfaces and meanings, intertextual relations between texts, a flatness 
or depthlessness, a superficiality that becomes associated with "the fragmentation and 
dissolution of the subject, with, in other words, the "death" of the autonomous bourgeois 
individual" (Johnston 145). Thus, the discussion of the nature of subjectivity takes on 
wider significance as one becomes aware of the postmodern revision of historical 
distinctions. It is as if in destablizing the notion of the individual consciousness, 
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poststructuralism also weakens those codifications of knowledge that Foucault suggests 
accompany the existence of this consciousness. As the notion of a persisting 
consciousness outside the material of language is undermined, so are those are those 
divisions of knowledge that reflect the existence of that form of subjectivity. 
Ashbery's poem is particularly interesting in that it not only shares postmodernism's 
preoccupation with language as a site for the construction of meaning, but also because it 
seeks to undermine those very same constructions. The poem is successful because it not 
only explores itself as a construction within language, demonstrating its dependence on the 
processes of deferral and displacement, but also because it passes between the ideal 
distinctions of theory and poetry. The poem, because it undermines distinctions in order to 
show their arbitrary construction within a language that is always literary and figurative, is 
able to offer an alternative discourse that passes between theory and poetry. It acts as a 
passing theory, negotiating the historically opposed discourses of poetry and theory, erasing 
the barriers that obstruct interaction between them. Ashbery' s poetry passes between the 
distinction of theory and poetry, says Charles Altieri, by bringing them together in order to 
move beyond the limits of each. As Altieri states: 
All the theoretical instruments seem to agree that our 
culture must develop versions of agency that neither 
return to romantic notions of a deep-buried and alienated 
self desperate for expression nor replace that inwardness 
by reducing subjectivity to subjection within linguistic 
and social codes. Yet, as I have argued on other occasions, 
contemporary theory has become so dependent of post-
structural concepts that it lacks the resources to develop 
an adequate third choice on this issue. . . . Our poets do 
better ... because they envision subjective agency in 
positive terms as a specific mode of dynamic intentionality 
inseparable from how we inhabit the sentences we speak. 
Developing their own way ... these poets offer a 
perspective that frees us from having to locate subjectivity 
in any specific image or narrative account. For they realize 
that such projections entail chains of significations and 
displacements that keep deferring that self until it can only 
appear a deeply buried and alienated principle. ("Motives 
in Metaphor" 215) 
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While theory is useful, Altieri argues, poetry is able to offer a powerful alternative to 
theoretical argument because of its ability to provide richer, more subtle and considerably 
more developed thinking than that provided by prevailing theoretical stances. Because of 
its awareness of how sentences form ideas, its understanding of the linguistic nature of the 
construction of meaning, poetry is able to resist framing its own arguments as static 
entities. In this way contemporary poets are able to mediate the romantic view of the self as 
beyond language and the contemporary theoretical view of the self as only a product of 
social codes and formations. Ashbery brings these poetic and theoretical discourses 
together to address the limits of both. 
Ashbery's poem does not so much begin as it continues. Taking or "mirroring" 
another reflective portrait, Ashbery's poem immediately opens up the postmodern 
possibilities with its title: "Self-Portrait In A Convex Mirror" is the title both of this poem 
and of Parmigianino' s Mannerist self-portrait. The continuing rather than beginning is 
compounded by the poem's use of the epic device of In Medias Res, the starting in the 
middle of things. Already one senses that the poem has set in motion or furthered an 
always already happening motion of representation. That is, by problematizing the notion 
of beginning through the "mirroring" title and the In Medias Res, Ashbery does not clearly 
distinguish between the portrait and the poem, between himself and Parmigianino, between 
artist and poet. The reflective surface created by the title and the positing of a similarity of 
artist and poet in the "As" also makes it difficult to determine who the author is here: 
Parmigianino or Ashbery? Not distinguishing, then, or making such distinctions as 
author/audience more difficult to talk about with certainty, becomes a means of opening up 
representation, representation which works not as an expression of the transcendental or a 
revealed essence or truth, but of itself. That is, representation does not indicate anything 
other than itself, it does not point to anything outside of itself. There is nothing to be 
expressed in art but art, the material instead of the spiritual: 
As Pannigianino did it, the right hand 
Bigger than the head, thrust at the viewer 
And swerving easily away, as though to protect 
What it advertises. A few leaded panes, old beams, 
Fur, pleated muslin, a coral ring run together 
In a movement supporting the face, which swims 
Toward and away like the hand 
Except that it is in repose. It is what is 
Sequestered. . . . 
("Self-Portrait" 68) 
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The distortion of the representation here, "The right hand I Bigger than the head," is like 
that of John Barth's Lost in the Funhouse. where the funhouse mirror of representation 
distorts and calls attention to itself in the process. The foregrounding, as well, of the tool 
of artifice--the right hand--is particularly interesting. It emphasizes not only the distortion 
of artifice, calling attention to itself, but also suggests the power of representation's own 
processes over authorial intention. Rather than describing any truthful or accurate depiction 
of the subject of representation, artifice is a copy of a copy, a simulacrum, a reflection of a 
reflection; and while an artist intends one thing, the mechanisms of artifice, the 
"distortions" of the funhouse mirror, circumvent such intentions. This always happens, 
says the poet. It is the way things get done: 
Seduced by flowers, 
Explicit pleasures, he blames himself (though 
Secretly satisfied with the result), imagining 
He had a say in the matter and exercised 
An option of which he was hardly conscious, 
Unaware that necessity circumvents such resolutions. 
So as to create something new 
For itself, that there is no other way, 
That the history of creation proceeds according to 
Stringent laws, and that things 
Do get done in this way, but never the things 
We set out to accomplish and wanted so desperately 
To see come into being. Pannigianino 
Must have realized this as he worked at his 
Life-obstructing task. 
("Self-Portrait" 80) 
Thus, while Parmigianino can be seen as intending to paint his "self," what he ends up 
painting, as the poet suggests, is the manner in which representation undoes such 
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intentions. In painting the self, then, Parmigianino is not so much painting it as he is 
painting painting. As the poem says: 
The glass chose to reflect what he saw 
Which was enough for his purpose: his image 
Glazed, embalmed, projected at a 180-degree angle. 
The time of day or the density of the light 
Adhering to the face keeps it 
Lively and intact in a recurring wave 
Of arrival. The soul establishes itself. 
But how far can it swim out through the eyes 
And still return safely to its nest? The surface 
Of the mirror being convex, the distance increases 
Significantly; that is, enough to make the point 
That the soul is a captive, treated humanely, kept 
In suspension, unable to advance much farther 
Than your look intercepts the picture. 
("Self-Portrait" 68-69) 
Captive, embalmed, glazed, in suspension, sequestered, unable to advance much further, 
the soul is bound up within the artifice that it would like to protect us from seeing. That is, 
the soul is rendered in the artifice of these productions--the painting and the poem--and, as 
such, is a captive of them, an effect of them and not a rendering of any "timeless essence of 
human nature." Artifice can continue to evoke the soul's "lively and intact" nature but only 
at the price of advertising the artifice of its own descriptions of it--the "recurring wave." 
The painting, the poem says, measures the extent to which art can actually depict something 
like the "self." And residing as it does in the artifice of the work--contingent and tenuous, 
dependent upon others for its recreation and realization--the soul is nothing. It is a thing 
without a sentence and, hence, not a thing at all. 
An integral part of this notion of representation as being representational of itself is 
that the ambivalence of the portrait prevents the positing of anything beyond itself. The 
painting/poem's subject is the artist himself, but given that any representation is only able 
to depict representation, the idea of being able to describe or render an account of the self 
outside the mediation of representation is undermined. In other words, what both 
Parmigianino and Ashbery posit is a view of representation that indicates only itself 
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because even the most realistic intentions are not able to escape the deferral that takes place 
in artifice. What representation depicts, according to the mechanisms of the poem, is its 
nature as a surface phenomena and not a medium of expression for transcendence or 
contact with the divine or the timeless nature of man: 
your eyes proclaim 
That everything is surface. The surface is what's there 
And nothing can exist except what's there. 
There are no recesses in the room, only alcoves .... 
("Self-Portrait" 70) 
The view expressed here towards representation bears on language in much the same way. 
As the poet notes, language, being a system of representation, is also caught up in the same 
mechanisms and processes. This leads the poet to suggest that just as there is only surface, 
only representation, there is no other language to bring attention to this but the language we 
have. There is no meta-language to describe how language works: 
And just as there are no words for the surface, that is, 
No words to say what it really is, that it is not 
Superficial but a visible core, then there is 
No way out of the problem of pathos vs. experience. 
("Self-Portrait" 70) 
Since there is no other language to discuss language, without being caught up in the same 
processes that make the notion of talking about something outside language so tenuous, 
what we are left with is the way of telling: 
But as the principle of each individual thing is 
Hostile to, exists at the expense of all the others 
As philosophers have often pointed out, at least 
This thing, the mute, undivided present, 
Has the justification of logic, which 
In this instance isn't a bad thing 
Or wouldn't be, if the way of telling 
Didn't somehow intrude, twisting the end result 
Into a caricature of itself. 
("Self-Portrait" 80; italics added) 
The way of telling defers the existence of the present. Telling intrudes upon it and twists it 
into something it isn't or wasn't before it got told. In other words, language, being a 
system whose materials are never fully present in themselves, but always already deferred, 
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"dooms in advance" those efforts to secure a fixed and determined truth, transcendence, or 
essence. Language, however, as emphasized in the "linguistic turn," is no longer 
determined by criteria that measure its success by its ability to correspond with a single 
truth or essence. 
Instead of lamenting this condition as one that continually removes us from ideals, 
Ashbery affirms this process of language as, paradoxically, the source of human creativity. 
As the poem says: 
What should be the vacuum of a dream 
Becomes continually replete as the source of dreams 
Is being tapped so that this one dream 
May wax, flourish like a cabbage rose .... 
("Self-Portrait" 73) 
A system, whose tenuousness as a surface phenomena, with nothing within it which would 
correspond with a truth out there, is not exactly what one would prefer to construct 
descriptions of the world with. However, the poem tells us this is precisely what happens--
and the poem, "this one dream," acts as embodiment of that principle. Supporting this 
point, the poem then returns to its citation of other texts and quotes a critical work on 
Parmigianino, stating that his Self-Portrait no longer produces an objective truth, but, as 
well, does not create a feeling of disharmony--as if truth were synonymous with harmony: 
The forms retain 
A strong measure of ideal beauty," because 
Fed by our dreams, so inconsequential until one day 
We notice the hole they left. Now their importance 
If not their meaning is plain. They were to nourish 
A dream which includes them all, as they are 
Finally reversed in the accumulating mirror. 
("Self-Portrait" 73) 
It is the system of language, without any fixity or correspondence to a truth that would 
ground it in a one-to-one relationship with the thing it describes, that allows for the 
emergence of beauty. It is the lack, the absence in human sentences of a timeless "truth," 
that allows beauty to be created. It is the "vacuum" that is language, a system built on 
absences, that allows "dreams," the creative imagination, to fill in the blanks and create 
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beauty. But these dreams, too, are holes--which we notice when we no longer hold to 
them, move on to other descriptions of the world and self, those too a "posture of a 
dream." The poem, thus, suggests its own cultural embeddedness, the sense that its own 
constructions are as contingent and context-bound as any, and that these, too, will come to 
be superseded at some point. 
Since Parmigianino's work is ostensibly a "self" portrait, his intention to represent it 
is subject to the processes of representation that make such intentions tenuous and 
"distorted," as well as making the idea of self out to be a mere "vacuum of a dream." The 
self is empty and devoid of any inherent meaning, except that created for it by its audience 
and therefore subject to the whims and fancies of change over time. Hence, the self is never 
present in itself, but is always subject to the way such ideas are constructed by historical 
periods. But this impulse in Ashbery to show how the idea of the self is contingent and 
caught up in the processes of representation and reception is always preceded or accompanied 
by the need to insert the notion of the possibility of a subjectivity beyond the materiality of 
language. There is a lingering romanticism which longs for the inexpressible, for what lies 
beyond rhetoric--as if it were difficult to admit, even in the face of evidence to the contrary, 
that it is a simply another false dream: 
And just as there are no words for the surface, that is, 
No words to say what it really is, that it is not 
Superficial but a visible core, then there is 
No way out of the problem of pathos vs. experience. 
("Self-Portrait" 70) 
As Ashbery tells it, the work expresses its inadequacies, its failure to achieve imaginary 
plenitude, its inability to offer a fully present account of the self. 
there is in that gaze a combination 
Of tenderness, amusement and regret, so powerful 
In its restraint that one cannot look for long. 
The secret is too plain. The pity of it smarts, 
Makes hot tears spurt: that the soul is not a soul, 
Has no secret, is small and it fits 
Its hollow perfectly: its room, our moment of attention. 
That is the tune but there are no words. 
The words are only speculation 
(From the Latin speculum, mirror): 
They seek and cannot find the meaning of the music 
We see only postures of the dream, 
Riders of the motion that swings the face 
Into view under evening skies, with no 
False disarray as proof of authenticity. 
("Self-Portrait" 69) 
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The soul is small, almost nonexistent--as far as its presence in the work goes--and is not 
even a soul. What the work represents is the obviousness of the lack of a secret: "that the 
soul is not a soul." It is not a secret, it is not anything other than the "hollow," "its room, 
our moment of attention" gives it. The soul is to the extent that it is given form in the 
work, to the extent that we engage and involve our attention as viewers or readers with it. 
But because the soul is nothing beyond its representation in the work, it offers no potential 
for being read as an idealized essence or source of meaning. This is the figure that the 
portrait attempts and fails, the tune with no words. Thus, with no sentence to describe it, 
no truth to its being or becoming, it goes on seeking words to say what meaning might be 
in the music. And the words we do have to describe the self in the portrait are simply 
"speculation"--contingent to the point that all we have are their cast-off shells, the empty 
signs of a de-idealized presence, the signs of signs, "postures of the dream." 
There is always, however, the possibility of reading in the painting an intention to 
reach out through the painting to the viewer by way of the depiction of a "realistic" 
presence in the figure of the painting. It is a desire on the part of the subject of the painting 
to leave the world of artifice, to erase the distinction between art and life, to be present; but 
it is art, after all, and as such prevents such intentions: 
it is life englobed. 
One would like to stick one's hand out of the globe, but its dimension, 
What carries it, will not allow it. 
("Self-Portrait" 69) 
Thus, the ambivalence of the painting/poem "which swims I Toward and away like the 
hand I Except it is in repose," and which would like to be present but is not able to, 
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reinforces the deferral of presence in representation; like the hand, the instrument of 
art(ifice ), the face appears to have life, presence, given to it by the realistic form of this 
painting. But it is like the hand in its ambivalence, swimming toward and away at the same 
time, unsure of whether it is protecting or advertising its status as representation and 
therefore never fully present in itself. This ambivalence is also suggested by the 
unspecified pronominal "it" in the line "It is what is sequestered," which could refer to 
either the face and/or the hand. The painting/poem hovers in suspension, somewhere 
between head and hand, protecting and/or advertising, coming near and moving away, so 
that the only meaning it is able to impart to its viewer is its status as representation, as art. 
The ambivalence apparent in the "Self-Portrait" is itself a sign of a broader anxiety 
in the poem concerning the materials and conditions of poetic representation. The deferral 
of a self-present figure of representation in the painting, which Ashbery reflects in the 
poem, not only suggests how the poem shares the poststructural milieu, but also indicates 
the conflicting impulses within this context that impinge on poetic representation. This is 
clear in Ashbery's positing throughout the poem of an area of mystery, a site beyond 
language that remains inexpressible but which exists side by side with the postmodern 
subversion of such possibilities: 
Love once 
Tipped the scales but now is shadowed, invisible, 
Though mysteriously present, around somewhere. 
But we know it cannot be sandwiched 
Between two adjacent moments, that its windings 
Lead nowhere except to further tributaries 
And that these empty themselves into a vague 
Sense of something that can never be known 
Even though it seems likely that each of us 
Knows what it is and is capable of 
Communicating it to each other. 
("Self-Portrait" 77) 
Though there is an aura of mystery, a landscape somehow invested with meaning, this 
ineffable is deflated by the knowledge that each of us can describe it to the other, reveal it 
and put it into language. In Ashbery, then, the notion of a mysterious realm beyond 
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language is still very much a part of poetic representation. However, this aura and mystery 
is constantly undercut by the view of language and representation as a phenomena that 
multiplies surf aces, indicating not the inexpressible but the mechanisms of representation 
and language themselves. As Anita Sokolsky puts it, these two impulses are always 
present in Ashbery: 
[Each time he] recognizes the portrait's pronouncement 
that there is only surface he reinserts a yearning for the 
ineffable, for the unsayable. After recognizing that "the 
soul is not a soul," he says "That is the tune, but there are 
no words"; as though the words "the soul is not a soul" 
need to posit the illusion that the language of disillusion 
can only approximate an impalpable, greater meaning .... 
These lines deliberately reinsert the opposition between the 
pathos of the unsayable, with its hidden reserve of meaning, 
and experience's implicit recognition that there is no more 
to be said than itself. The narcissistic dynamic which posits 
the greater and unimaginable capacity for gratification in the 
other emerges in the poem whenever Ashbery reinserts a 
nostalgic desire for mystery, for the inexpressible nature of 
experience: the pathos of imagining that words are inadequate 
to their capacity for meaning. Thus, Francesco's portrait 
enacts for Ashbery the dynamic between, on one hand, a 
recognition of the illusion of hidden meaning, and, on the 
other, the perpetual need to invest that moment of recognition 
with a sense of pathos. (240-241) 
Thus, the anxiety of the poem is seen in its inability or deliberate refusal to decide between 
the postmodern critique of the illusion of hidden meaning (all is on the surface) or the 
romantic view of language as inadequate for the expression of contact with the divine. It is 
because of this ambivalence, perhaps, that the poet brings together theory and poetry. 
While maintaining the tension between the postmodern and the romantic views of language, 
the poet is able to create a "passing theory" between these two historically and critically 
antithetical discourses. The postmodern poet, in other words, needs both discourses in 
order see over the limits of each. Poetry and theory, both aware of the linguistic 
construction of consciousness, the poststructural denial of a metalanguage, come together 
in Ashbery for the purpose of limiting the effects of a transcendental romanticism and for 
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the purpose of suggesting our continued need for something more than self-referential 
mirror games. As the poem puts it: 
There is no other way, and those assholes 
Who would confuse everything with their mirror games 
Which seem to multiply stakes and possibilities, or 
At least confuse issues by means of an investing 
Aura that would corrode the architecture 
Of the whole in a haze of suppressed mockery, 
Are beside the point. They are out of the game, 
Which doesn't exist until they are out of it. 
("Self-Portrait" 79-80) 
What the postmodern context and poststructural concepts offer Ashbery, then, are a means 
with which to invest and corrode his own poetic project at the same time. Ashbery' s 
investing and corroding poem is what has been called a "self-consuming artifact," a text 
that while putting itself together, takes itself apart at the same time. Constructing itself 
from the residues of meaning that the poet finds in Parmigianino' s painting, the poem 
cannot be said to be either clearly contiguous or whole in and of itself, nor clearly original 
with the poet--particularly since it makes such a point of constructing itself from the 
discourse of others. "Self-Portrait" not only uses quotations and parts of speech from 
other critics in order to make itself, but internalizes intertextuality and reception theory as 
part of its own creative process: 
A peculiar slant 
Of memory that intrudes on the dreaming model 
In the silence of the studio as he considers 
Lifting the pencil to the self-portrait. 
How many people came and stayed a certain time, 
Uttered light or dark speech that became part of you 
Like light behind windblown fog and sand, 
Filtered and influenced by it, until no part 
Remains that is surely you. 
("Self-Portrait" 71) 
Ashbery's intrusion of his own present circumstances and exigencies become linked with 
the painter's creative act--they are virtually indistinguishable, they fuse together in the 
present of the poem. 
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Furthermore, the discussion of the painting's reception, by Pope Clement, suggests 
the intertextual creation of any text: that is, the view that a work of art is not so much the 
result of itself, but of what others say about it, how it is received by audiences, and how it 
is critically interpreted and responded to. Ashbery's poem is well aware of this process, 
how other people talking and writing about Parmigianino, even Ashbery himself for that 
matter, come to constitute what that work is. It is not so much the work itself which 
creates its meanings, says the poem, but what others say and have said about it. It is the 
accumulation of words and other images that refer to the work which come to constitute its 
meaning. Constructing itself as intertext and critical reflection on the processes of 
representation, Ashbery's poem resists stability and fixity. It is laid out over a terrain of 
references and citations and quotations in such a way that gathering them into unity does 
not establish unity but, instead, plurality and discontinuity. Putting his text together in a 
parasitic or derivative manner, the poet intimates that representation proceeds in this way--
"This always I Happens, as in the game where I A whispered phrase passed around the 
room I Ends up as something completely different" (80)--and never allows access to what 
might be called "original." In this way, each part comes to be a part of the poem, but in a 
fashion that resists the attribution of an originary or idealized sense to it: 
The hand holds no chalk 
And each part of the whole falls off 
And cannot know it knew, except 
Here and there, in cold pockets 
Of remembrance, whispers out of time. 
("Self-Portrait" 83) 
As the poem puts itself together, then, from the bits and pieces of discourse available to it, 
speaking through these, it avoids reduction to a single clear determinate principle or 
meaning. In this way, Ashbery retains a sense of mystery and aura, the pathos of 
something beyond language, since "each part" cannot be reduced to an isolated and 
uncorrupted status as origin. However, Ashbery also retains the postmodern critical view 
that works against this ideal of the inexpressible by emphasizing language as a surface 
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phenomena of signs, not as deep structural meaning or an inadequate medium for the 
expression of a transcendent ideal or essence. 
Passing between the postmodern/poststructural views of language and 
representation and the romantic pathos of a self that resists being given shape, Ashbery' s 
poem not only responds to the opposition between theory and poetry but to the 
contemporary revision of this difference. By addressing the poststructuralist notions of 
subjectivity and bringing them into contact with a residual romanticism that posits an 
idealized version of self as beyond representation, Ashbery indicates the limits of both 
discourses. He creates a poem that speculates on its own ability to construct a speaking, 
writing, knowing subject and, thus, demonstrates the contingent nature of this creation 
called the self. Writing and reflecting become a process that work in conjunction with each 
other--building up and tearing down simultaneously. The self-consuming nature of this 
process-as-poem gives us the limits of the view of self beyond expression and the limits of 
a self that is only the effect of cultural and historical significations, since both needs and 
impulses remain but cancel each other out. It is in this way that Ashbery implicates the 
conventions of both versions of subjectivity and rejects both. As he says of the convention 
of realism in Parmigianino: 
Aping naturalness may be the first step 
But it is the first step only, and often 
Remains a frozen gesture of welcome etched 
On the air materializing behind it, 
A convention. And we have really 
No time for these, except to use them 
For kindling. The sooner they are burnt up 
The better for the roles we have to play. 
("Self-Portrait" 82) 
As these conventions are burnt up in Ashbery's poem, we are left holding something that 
slips between our fingers like sand--"the 'it was all a dream' I Syndrome, though the 'all' 
tells tersely I Enough how it wasn't" ("Self-Portrait" 82)--and like the "waking dream" the 
poem has made and unmade itself in a process that does not so much reconcile oppositions 
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like theory and poetry but passes between the criteria for either. In this way, then, Ashbery 
not only suggests the historical limits of theoretical and poetic models, but also implies that 
their limits are our opportunity. In burning up the conventions of these discourses, seeing 
them as the conventions they are, an alternative may emerge. 
Chapter Four 
Revising Literary Traditions: 
Ashbery's (Dis)engagement with Romanticism and Modernism 
I 
While a great deal of critical examination of "Self-Portrait" has concerned itself 
with the philosophical, theoretical, and aesthetic formulations operating within it, less 
attention has been paid to how the poem addresses and engages with its own specific 
cultural heritage. Discussion of the concepts and ideas that make up the poem's dynamics 
is valuable; but without a reading of "Self-Portrait" as a site for the intermingling and 
transformation of aesthetic traditions its character is overlooked. This is so because the 
poem's engagement with issues that stem from romantic and modernist traditions, the 
manner in which it speaks through these issues and shapes them to postmodern ends, 
demands a reading that does not posit the poem as simply "postmodern," "romantic," or 
"modernist." To pigeon-hole the poem as categorically stable is to misrepresent its explicit 
erasure of hard and fast distinctions, especially as they affect the poem's relationship to its 
aesthetic past. 
Although there are differing views as to what constitutes the categories of 
modernism and romanticism, there are several impulses generally accepted as characteristic. 
Among those that M.H. Abrams (115-117) identifies as constitutive of romanticism are: 
(1) an attitude favoring innovation over traditionalism in the materials, forms, and style of 
literature; (2) nature becoming a main focus of poetry, but most often used to prompt a 
meditation on human problems; (3) literature developing not so much about "men" in action 
as about a writer's particular feelings; (4) literature coming to be seen as spontaneous, 
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"natural," and, thus, the opposite of artful composition; (5) poetry depicting the poet 
themself as the subject of the poem. Quite often that depiction, too, is of an outcast or 
isolated and individual figure; ( 6) the highest art for the romantics consisted in an endeavor 
beyond finite human possibility. Thus, a preference for the imperfect, which depicted the 
failure of the artist and demonstrates the grandeur of his aim. 
Surprisingly, "Self-Portrait" falls within the range of these characteristics, although 
in a highly refracted fashion. The poem's attitude is most assuredly innovative towards 
issues of material, form, and style, but, here again, it is typically ambivalent. Taking a 
work of "high" art as its ostensible subject, for example, Parmigianino's first "Self-
Portrait" is not exactly an embracing of the "common." The poem's style retains the 
romantic imperative to use the real language of men, but it pushes the boundaries of sense 
in its obstrusiveness and vagueness, its indefiniteness and duplicity of reference. Its form, 
long and meandering, seems a middle ground between radical disjunction and formalism. 
The other characteristics Abrams identifies are also part of the poem, in their 
modified versions, and serve to amplify Ashbery's revision of the romantic tradition. The 
poem is obviously self-referential, obviously taking as its subject the nature of a self in the 
midst of contemplating a work of art. Moreover, it often makes the vicissitudes of 
contemplation part of itself: 
The balloon pops, the attention 
Turns dully away. Clouds 
In the puddle stir up into sawtoothed fragments. 
I think of the friends 
Who came to see me, of what yesterday 
Was like. 
("Self-Portrait" 71) 
This, too, is a "spontaneous" emotion, a recollection of an experience of perception 
recorded by the poet. For Ashbery, however, the sense of the poem as a recording of a 
fleeting moment of perception is always "artful." It is always part of the processes of 
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artifice, always shaped and given form through art, always mediated by the poem. There is 
no other way: 
But as the principle of each individual thing is 
Hostile to, exists at the expense of all the others 
As philosophers have often pointed out, at least 
This thing, the mute, undivided present, 
Has the justification of logic, which 
In this instance isn't a bad thing 
Or wouldn't be, if the way of telling 
Didn't somehow intrude, twisting the end result 
Into a caricature of itself. This always 
Happens, as in the game where 
A whispered phrase passed around the room 
Ends up as something completely different. 
It is the principle that makes works of art so unlike 
What the artist intended. Often he finds 
He has omitted the thing he started out to say 
In the first place. 
("Self-Portrait" 80) 
It is significant, here, that rather than taking nature as its ostensible starting point for a 
meditation on "the nature of man," Ashbery's poem takes "art" as the starting point for a 
meditation on the nature of representing subjectivity. Thus, maintaining the romantic 
tradition of depicting the state of emotions of the poet, making the poet the subject of the 
poem, Ashbery turns this heritage on its head by evoking and then disassembling it, 
showing how the valorization of the individual poet is ultimately shaped by the conventions 
used to depict his self: "Since it is a metaphor I Made to include us, we are a part of it and I 
Can live in it as in fact we have done ... " ("Self-Portrait" 76). The effect of Ashbery's 
inversion of romanticism is to undercut and subvert from within the conventions of a 
humanistic, essentialized, mythic view of subjectivity--particularly the romantic idealization 
of the poet. We see this any number of times through out the poem where, rather than 
perceiving some human "truth," the poet is continually confronted by his own "otherness": 
What is novel is the extreme care in rendering 
The velleities of the rounded reflecting surface 
(It is the first mirror portrait), 
So that you could be fooled for a moment 
Before you realize the reflection 
Isn't yours. You feel then like one of those 
Hoffman characters who have been deprived 
Of a reflection .... 
("Self-Portrait" 74) 
There is also the very similar passage: 
This otherness, this 
"Not-being-us" is all there is to look at 
In the mirror, though no one can say 
How it came to be this way. 
("Self-Portrait" 81) 
53 
It is worth remarking, though, that as much as passages like these seem to call into 
question the poet's ability to posit a self outside of poetic or aesthetic conventions, they 
also share romanticism's belief in the inadequacy of language. As Abrams points out, the 
romantics believed in humanity's "unquenchable aspirations beyond its assigned limits" 
( 117). Romanticism sought after the absolute, the ideal, the infinite, the inaccessible. This 
is, in effect, the postulation of a realm beyond human expression, a realm that remains 
yearned for but never achieved. It provides the romantics with a source of energy that 
motivates their "spontaneous overflow of emotion" and becomes a source of mystery 
within their work. It is much the same gesture that occurs in Ashbery's work, setting up 
the self as "other," as some thing that always remains unknowable. 
If we compare Ashbery's romanticism with that of Walt Whitman's, the differences 
between them will indicate the character of Ashbery's engagement with a residual 
romanticism. Harold Bloom has often remarked on the genealogy that stems from 
Whitman, by way of Wallace Stevens, to Ashbery. As Bloom says, like his "master" 
Stevens, Ashbery is essentially a ruminative poet," turning a few subjects over and over, 
knowing always that what counts is the mythology of self, blotched out beyond 
unblotching" (7). But it is Whitman who remains Ashbery' s largest ancestor, providing 
the basis of a conscious manipulation and exaggeration of subjectivity for American poets 
(Bloom 7). When Whitman writes that "I celebrate myself, I And what I assume you shall 
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assume, I For every atom belonging to me as good belongs to you" (Whitman 25) he 
initiates the contemplation of poetic self that American romanticism has come to be 
synonymous. "I loafe and invite my soul, I I lean and loafe at my ease .... observing a 
spear of grass," says Whitman (25), opening the door towards a contemplation of self in 
American poetry. It is also significant that the subjectivity described here is quite similar to 
the one in "Self-Portrait," in that it is less concerned with separating itself from other 
subjectivities than in highlighting the exchanges and interactions that take place between 
them. Whitman's celebration of self, for its own sake, is also an invitation extended to the 
reader to partake in the experience of the expansive self-consciousness, not terribly 
dissimilar from the contact the poet makes with Parmigianino in "Self-Portrait." That is, as 
Whitman extends an invitation to the reader to contemplate their own or Whitman's self, 
Parmigianino's portrait similarly extends an invitation to the poet to contemplate the self of 
painter and poet which come to commingle. Here, for instance, the poet notes the 
experience of looking at the portrait, how his attention has dissipated; but as the poem 
progresses, it becomes clear that the "he" could either be Parmigianino or the poet: 
The balloon pops, the attention 
Tums dully away. Clouds 
In the puddle stir up into sawtoothed fragments. 
I think of the friends 
Who came to see me, of what yesterday 
Was like. A peculiar slant 
Of memory that intrudes on the dreaming model 
In the silence of the studio as he considers 
Lifting the pencil to the self-portrait. 
("Self-Portrait" 71) 
As the subjectivity moves through this passage, what is remarkable is the shift between the 
two sentences. The first sentence, noting the dissolution of an attentive contemplation of 
the portrait in a first-person account, is then modified in the second sentence to denote a 
third person perspective. It moves from an "I" to a "he," as if the poet were suddenly 
receding before himself as he continues to write, no longer describing the experience of the 
portrait but the experience of a subjectivity--the "he" --other than his own that is 
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constructing a self-portrait. Characteristically, this could be the poet describing himself in 
third-person and/or Parmigianino in first-person. 
The difficulty of distinguishing between the poet and the painter in "Self-Portrait" 
has its counterpart in "Song of Myself' in those long sections where the poet's all-
encompassing self flies "the flight of the fluid and swallowing soul" (Whitman 61 ). 
Traversing the difference between his self, the selves of others and the physical world, 
Whitman's soul is part of everything and everything is a part of him: 
I visit the orchards of God and look at the spheric product, 
And look at quintillions ripened, and look at quintillions green. 
I fly the flight of the fluid and swallowing soul, 
My course runs below the soundings of plummets. 
I help myself to material and immaterial, 
No guard can shut me off, no law prevent me. 
(Whitman 60-61). 
This "transcendental power" of the soul which enables it to be in contact with all things 
allows Whitman, as a poet, to mingle and conjoin irreconcilable aspects of the world 
within a single, all-encompassing poem. It allows him to create a self from the various 
voices of experience. As the poet says, "And these tend inward to me, and I tend outward 
to them, I And as such as it is to be of these more or less I am, I And of these one and all I 
weave the song of myself' (Whitman 40): 
Through me many long dumb voices, 
Voices of the interminable generations of slaves, 
Voices of prostitutes and of deformed persons, 
Voices of the diseased and despairing, and of thieves and dwarfs, 
Voices of cycles of preparation and accretion, 
And of the threads that connect the stars--and of wombs, and of the 
fatherstuff, 
And of the rights of them the others are down upon, 
Of the trivial and flat and foolish and despised, 
Of fog in the air and beetles rolling balls of dung. 
Through me forbidden voices, 
Voices of sexes and lusts .... voices veiled, and I remove the veil, 
Voices indecent by me clarified and transfigured. 
(Whitman 48) 
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In constructing a self from a multitude of voices, a self that is able to encompass all, able to 
traverse the boundaries of space and time, Whitman constructs a self that believes itself able 
to reveal the deeper logic and meaning behind the multitude of differences that make up the 
world. Because it is part of all things, subjectivity in this poem sees itself as having access 
to what lies beyond appearances; each person, each animal and thing in "Song of Myself' 
is part of a larger whole, each thing only a part of a larger order it can only see a part of. 
As Whitman says, "A few quadrillions of eras, a few octillions of cubic leagues, do not I 
hazard the span or make it impatient, I They are but parts . . . . any thing is but a part" 
(Whitman 79). Quite often, though, the poetic reach toward that larger order comes up 
against the impulse to obscure it, to place the larger order behind all the seeming disparity 
beyond expression, outside the capabilities of a limited human knowledge: 
My voice goes after what my eyes cannot reach, 
With the twirl of my tongue I encompass worlds and volumes of 
worlds. 
Speech is the twin of my vision .... it is unequal to measure itself. 
It provokes me forever, 
It says sarcastically, Walt, you understand enough .... why don't 
you let it out then? 
Come now I will not be tantalized .... you conceive too much of 
articulation. 
(Whitman 50-51) 
Whitman's promotion of his abilities to "unscrew the doors from their jambs," to "wash the 
gum" from our eyes, to remove the veil, also insists upon an area, a realm, some 
knowledge that escapes his will or ability to express: 
There is that in me .... I do not know what it is .... but I know 
it is in me. 
Wrenched and sweaty .... calm and cool then my body becomes; 
I sleep .... I sleep long. 
I do not know it .... it is without name .... it is a word unsaid, 
It is not in any dictionary or utterance or symbol. 
Something it swings on more than the earth I swing on, 
To it the creation is the friend whose embracing awakes me. 
Perhaps I might tell more .... Outlines! I plead for my brothers 
and sisters. 
Do you see 0 my brothers and sisters? 
It is not chaos or death .... it is form and union and plan .... it 
is eternal life .... it is happiness. 
(Whitman 84-85) 
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This is the essential romantic dilemma, believing the imagination capable of all things while 
needing to retain a source of energy and mystery that motivates works of the imagination. 
That is, if the imagination were capable of revealing all there would only need to be one 
representative work that told it all--all else would be pointless and redundant. What else 
would need to be said if one were capable of saying it all? 
Whitman and Ashbery both wrestle with this romantic situation. But whereas 
Whitman believes himself capable of suggesting the presence of a truth, albeit a truth 
alternately knowable and unknowable, Ashbery, on the other hand, distances himself from 
the rhetorical grandeur of Whitman's all-encompassing romanticism. Ashbery stands 
between being able to represent what the imagination is capable of and the sense that the 
imagination is all there is to say. As Ashbery suggests in "Self-Portrait": 
You will stay on, restive, serene in 
Your gesture which is neither embrace nor warning 
But which holds something of both in pure 
Affirmation that doesn't affirm anything. 
("Self-Portrait" 70) 
The poet, observing the portrait, sees something in it that mirrors his own project, his own 
purpose in relation to the dilemma he has inherited from the past. The only way to deal 
with this dilemma is to see it as present and absent at the same time or, as it is put here, an 
affirmation that doesn't affirm anything. It is an in-between gesture, an ambivalence that 
hesitates between at least two possibilities and unsure of which way to proceed. This is the 
situation Ashbery's poem is confronted with: how to proceed in light of what possibilities 
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remain. It is the same situation that the poet ultimately finds tiring in the portrait (and his 
own poem, perhaps), but which might contain new possibilities: 
If they are to become classics 
They must decide which side they are on. 
Their reticence has undermined 
The urban scenery, made its ambiguities 
Look willful and tired, the games of an old man. 
What we need now is this unlikely 
Challenger pounding on the gates of an amazed 
Castle. Your argument, Francesco, 
Had begun to grow stale as no answer 
Or answers were forthcoming. If it dissolves now 
Into dust, that only means its time had come 
Some time ago, but look now, and listen: 
It may be that another life is stocked there 
In recesses no one knew of; that it, 
Not we are the change; that we are in fact it .... 
("Self-Portrait" 76) 
It is as if the poet were suggesting that the ambivalence, the ambiguity that is to be found in 
the portrait, is stale and unsuited to our present needs; but he also makes it clear that 
perhaps within this ambivalence lies another possibility. Typically, though, the poet does 
not allow the possibility to emerge into any transcendental or sublime ideal--it remains only 
a possibility etched in the air: 
Of course some things 
Are possible, it knows, but it doesn't know 
Which ones. Some day we will try 
To do as many things as are possible 
And perhaps we shall succeed at a handful 
Of them, but this will not have anything 
To do with what is promised today .... 
("Self-Portrait" 72) 
Confronting the in-betweenness of the tradition he has inherited, Ashbery in "Self-
Portrait" turns the sublime and transcendental moments to be found in American poets like 
Whitman on their heads, inverts them in a way that drains them of their privileged moments 
of vision. In order to do this, however, Ashbery must work within the rhetoric of 
idealism, suggesting in much the same way Whitman does, the power of the imagination. 
Although one can see this gesture growing out of Whitman himself, it is Ashbery's 
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foregrounding of both the possibility of the imagination and its limits within tradition and 
convention that distances him from a Whitmanian faith. As Bloom states, the difficulty for 
Ashbery is "how to construct something upon which to rejoice when you are the heir of 
this tradition, yet reject both privileged moments of vision and any privileged heightenings 
of rhetoric in the deliberately subdued and even tone of your work": 
For Ashbery, the privileged moments, like their images, 
are on the dump, and he wants to purify them by clearly 
placing them there. Say of what you see in the dark, 
Stevens urges, that it is this or that it is that, but do not 
use the rotted names. Use the rotted names, Ashbery 
urges, but cleanse them by seeing that you cannot be 
apart from them, and are partly redeemed by consciously 
suffering with them. (Bloom 65) 
In exactly this way, then, Ashbery both affirms and doesn't affirm the romantic tradition 
and the rhetorical possibilities he inherits from it. 
II 
As strongly as Ashbery grapples with the inheritance of the romantic tradition, the 
form of his engagement is quite modernist. That is, the manner in which Ashbery inhabits 
the forms of the past in order to empty them of their privileged moments is a modernist 
strategy, used to highlight the incompatibility of those aesthetic forms with our experiential 
lives. As Abrams points out, the modernist revolt against traditional literary forms and 
subjects that took place after World War I questioned the coherent and stable world those 
forms presupposed (109). The modernists, concerned about the immense discrepancy 
between the aesthetic order of tradition and the chaos they found themselves living within, 
undertook experiments with new forms and styles that often took the form of radical 
disjunction and disruption. Within this aesthetic disorder the audience was left to 
contemplate the various parts and to work towards inventing or discovering the connections 
that could reveal order and plan. This modification, however, for all its disturbances of 
order, simply replaces one order with another, reinscribes it in the form of disorder meant 
to be plumbed for meaning and significance. Ashbery, similarly, disturbs conventional 
order, disrupts the conventional reading experience, but instead of suggesting an alternative 
order he flattens the possibility of its emergence within his neutralilzed sentences and logic. 
Typically, Ashbery confronts the aesthetic past and the privileged moments of 
insight it offers, but while there is a temptation to posit the possibility of order and meaning 
there always remains something that must be held at a distance: 
for, 
Though only exercise or tactic, it carries 
The momentum of a conviction that had been building. 
Mere forgetfulness cannot remove it 
Nor wishing bring it back, as long as it remains 
The white precipitate of its dream 
In the climate of sighs flung across our world, 
A cloth over a birdcage. 
("Self-Portraif' 77) 
61 
The conviction in possibilities of realization, of epiphany, of meaning, is confronted by the 
poet, but this certainty remains only an "exercise or tactic" never a clearly discernible or 
stable order or meaning. However, it is a possibility that no matter how distant or how 
skeptical the poet might be of it, it remains hovering, "mysteriously present, around 
somewhere" ("Self-Portrait" 77). Simple forgetfulness cannot make it disappear and 
wishing does nothing to bring it any closer. It is a mirage that is still with us, but only a 
precipitate, a derived product or result and not the thing itself. Ashbery, characteristically, 
gives us not only the possibility of order or meaning as a "precipitate," but goes on to 
obscure or bury that possibility in a compound of images and references; not only is the 
possibility of transcendent meaning impossible to forget and to bring back, but it remains 
so as long as it is not the thing itself, in an atmosphere that longs for it, that believes it 
remains to be revealed. Caught between not being able to forget it and not being able to 
grasp it, the poet remains in a disembodied, neutral space. His "thought-associations," 
compared to those epiphanous moments of the past, are gray and empty: 
The fertile 
Thought-associations that until now came 
So easily, appear no more, or rarely. Their 
Colorings are less intense, washed out 
By autumn rains and winds, spoiled, muddied, 
Given back to you because they are worthless. 
("Self-Portrait" 81) 
Devoid of the potential offered by modernism of an alternative order emerging from the 
imagination, Ashbery, working within the disruptions and dislocations of meaning the 
modernists are synonymous with, revises the modernist alternative to suggest its 
emptiness: 
Each person 
Has one big theory to explain the universe 
But it doesn't tell the whole story 
And in the end it is what is outside him 
That matters, to him and especially to us 
Who have been given no help whatever 
In decoding our own man-size quotient and must rely 
On second-hand knowledge. Yet I know 
That no one else's taste is going to be 
Any help, and might as well be ignored. 
("Self-Portrait" 81-82) 
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The universal answers, the poet suggests, simply do not explain the "whole story," no 
matter how complete they take themselves to be. We do not even understand ourselves, 
"our own man-size quotient" of the universe, and we must come to accept that we can only 
glimpse partial and incomplete answers--"second-hand knowledge." 
Ashbery's refraction of the aesthetic past is also apparent in his adaptation of 
inherited forms to suit postmodernist impulses. Using the long poem with a lyrical 
emphasis, Ashbery's poem undermines distinctions between the lyric's short, introspective 
insights and the epic's length and breadth of scope. In traditional fashion, the poem 
accepts as its epic quest the contemporary search for self; but it shapes that quest with the 
lyric' s concern for personal expression into a pursuit that yields only incomplete and 
transitory moments that are soon lost again. Modernist in its hybridization of the lyrical 
impulse within the proportions of the long or epic poem, Ashbery is also postmodernist in 
denying the emergence of new forms of perception from this generic mutation. 
Describing "Self-Portrait" as long for "our damaged attention spans these days," 
Harold Bloom states that the poem is a revision of Whitman's "Song of Myself," a poem 
often identified as an American epic (115). While not explicitly calling "Self-Portrait" an 
epic, Bloom's discussion of its revision of the earlier poem suggests that the scope of 
Ashbery's poem is similarly large--by contemporary standards, anyway. More clearly 
"epic," however, is the poem's inner form, its subject. This distinction between inner and 
outer form of the epic is an important characteristic of contemporary versions of epic 
poetry, according to Thomas Vogler's Preludes To Vision: 
First, the genre has most often been treated in formal 
and structural terms (outer form), and this is precisely 
the approach that is least likely to lead us to· the nature 
of the modern mode of epic. The second reason is more 
complex, for the inner form of epic has remained essentially 
the same, while the problems of that inner form have 
changed, and changed in a qualitative rather than merely 
quantitative fashion. (5) 
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Putting it in the most humanistic terms, Vogler' s view of epic seeks to remain outside of 
the differences of inner and outer form by seeing as constant the one feature he sees as 
common throughout: that epics are "poems of man in the fullest sense, facing the ultimate 
challenges of his time, responding with the fullest energy and endurance of his faculties, 
and achieving some kind of victory over the circumstances that constitute a challenge to his 
society's continued existence" (6). Attempts at formulating differences between epic and 
other genres are difficult if not impossible if they overlook this common feature, says 
Vogler (6). "The trouble with an attempt to formulate the inner form of epic in a few words 
is that any description of the epic on a highly general level will also sound like a description 
of tragedy" (Vogler 6). 
Vogler finds it more useful to focus upon the changes in the consciousness of 
"man" that manifest themselves in the modern epic. Since "man" changes over time, so 
does "his" poetry. Instead of attempting a definition of the specific elements of the inner 
form of epic, Vogler sees it as that genre wherein "man" confronts the challenges of "his" 
time. Thus, rather than laying out particular formal structures and features in order to 
define the epic, Vogler holds that what remains constant as "epic subject matter" is its 
location as a poetic site for the major struggles and dilemmas of different cultures and 
periods. Dependent upon the cultural context of each age and period, the nature of these 
challenges changes and, consequently, the nature of epic subjects changes: 
Although this common denominator of all poems that 
we call epic is the same, the factors that produce a true 
epic can and do change radically. What changes is the 
poet's conception of man, and perhaps even the very 
nature of man as his relation to his world changes. 
(Vogler 6) 
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The difficulty, then, both in creating and recognizing a modem epic, is that our culture does 
not provide the same sorts of materials which earlier epic poets worked with. "There is no 
common ideology, no vital, central source for universally acceptable concepts of authority 
and value," says Vogler (8): 
In the absence of an accepted spiritual orientation of the 
collective consciousness and of a shared sense of value, 
the nature of achievable epic poetry must change; but the 
possibility of epic poetry does not necessarily disappear. 
The nature of the epic challenge to man becomes that of 
finding, rather than preserving, an acceptable collective 
ideology of some kind. . . . Before a poet can do this, 
he must have a firm faith in the power of poetic vision 
as a mode of finding ultimate truths about the nature of 
man; he must have the highest possible estimate of the 
powers of the poetic imagination and complete faith in 
that estimate. (Vogler 9) 
Vogler' s sense, here, of the humanistic nature of the epic enterprise, his faith in a poet's 
"finding ultimate truths about the nature of man," for all its awareness of the determined 
construction of "consciousness," still predicates a belief in a subject called "man" that 
searches unceasingly for transhistorical "ultimate truths." This may assist the critic in 
assessing older forms of epic, but it does not help us with Ashbery because of his skepticism 
towards the "whole story." What is valuable in Vogler's perspective, though, is that as 
"man" changes, so does epic poetry. More specifically, what is useful in Vogler' s 
discussion is how he sees modem epic poetry as more overtly concerned with itself, with its 
own structures and possibilities, as a way of discovering different ways of knowing the 
world. Faced with the impossibility and absence of widely accepted collective beliefs as the 
basis on which to write, contemporary poets must tum to the most basic epistemological 
problems of vision and perception, dwelling on the potential that resides in poetry as a form 
of knowledge. In other words, modem poets, lacking cultural consensus upon which to 
ground their project, tum inward and speculate on the forms and structures of poetic 
discourse as a way of knowing the world. The "epic" poem, then, becomes not so much a 
search for universal or ultimate truths, but an emptying out of the forms knowledge has 
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taken. This emptying out is "epic" because it is one of the major dilemmas that confronts 
poets at the present, the problem of creating forms of know ledge that resist becoming static 
and unchanging models of perception. In effect, then, what the contemporary epic depicts, at 
least in terms of Ashbery's poem, is the struggle with the condition of needing older forms 
and traditions in order to convey meaning, but remaining highly suspicious of them. 
It is the continuing need for a shared sense of meaning and the skepticism towards 
any single concrete form meaning might take that preoccupies Ashbery. As much as this 
preoccupation is a shared cultural preoccupation, Ashbery' s "Self-Portrait" meets Vogler' s 
criteria for the inner form of an epic. There is, for instance, widespread acknowledgment 
of the "meta-fictional" or "self-reflexive" impulse within contemporary literature, which 
suggests some degree of common concern within various forms of aesthetic production. 
Thus, it should come as no surprise that a contemporary long poem meditates upon the 
possibilities and difficulties of the poetic imagination. What is remarkable about this 
widely shared self-reflexiveness, though, is that it constitutes a form of aesthetic faith--in 
the negative. To Vogler, epic offered a collective faith in poetry as a valid mode of 
perceiving reality, an embodiment of truth for a culture; for Ashbery, on the other hand, 
even that faith in poetry is something we can no longer have. Instead of establishing any 
privileged position or vision of human nature or "ultimate truths" in his poetry, Ashbery 
demonstrates their waning. It is this waning, this skepticism, which replaces Vogler' s faith 
as the collective basis of the contemporary epic. 
Tapping into the collective modernist negativity and skepticism towards inherited 
forms of consciousness and aesthetics, Ashbery's poem fuses the epic's summation of 
culturally shared dilemmas with the lyrical insight of the shorter poem. This, says Charles 
Altieri, is what is most distinctive about the modernist long poem, its "desire to achieve epic 
breadth by relying on structural principles inherent in lyric rather than narrative modes" 
("Motives in Metaphor" 653). Only by relying on the "poetic logic" of the lyrical sort can 
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the poem free itself from the distorting influences and ideology of traditional representation. 
The long poem, because it can overcome the limitations of ordinary logics by multiplying 
perspectives, voices and emotive contexts made available by the juxtaposition of lyric and 
epic, pushes the reader towards exploring implicit relational patterns as the only possible 
sources of thematic coherence (Altieri, "Motives in Metaphor" 653). However, even the 
modernist defense of the lyrical is a corruption produced by the cultural heritage (Altieri, 
"Motives in Metaphor" 654). The modernist defense of the imagination, with its promotion 
of the lyrical as a challenge to conventional notions of unity and coherence, is not a reaction 
that places it beyond the influence and ideology of "traditional representation," but is 
consonant with its vicissitudes. That is, the modernist reaction to the investment of cultural 
authority and explanatory powers in rationality is a response determined by the 
demystification of the imagination. The modernist defense of the lyrical sensibility is part of 
the cultural fabric and cannot be understood without it. Modernism's claims of revealing an 
alternative order amidst the chaos of the world are brought about by an earlier secularization 
and rationalization of the imagination. Modernism's claims of novelty and radical disruption 
from traditional forms and order are unfounded, especially since they cannot be understood 
except in relation to earlier movements and styles. 
Modernism's defense and reification of the imagination is not only part of the 
heritage which Ashbery must confront, but is also part of the central conflict in American 
poetry today. It is a conflict between the romantic belief in the imaginative powers of the 
lyric sensibility and the enlightenment drive for demystification. Taking its form in ideals 
of lucidity and lyricism, says Altieri, enlightenment demystification and romantic 
valorization of the imagination leave us struggling with the conflicting impulses they have 
left us. Lyricism, as Altieri uses it, describes all attempts to use literature "for affirming in 
ostensibly secular forms predicates about the mind, person, and society that were the basic 
images of dignity and value in religious or 'organic' cultures" (Self and Sensibility 13); 
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lucidity is a reaction to the pressures that drive writers to develop "psychic economies that 
can restore a world compatible with our imaginative forms of ideal personal qualities" (Self 
and Sensibility 13). Lyricism, as a result of enlightenment demystification, developed as 
an attempt to infuse reason, albeit in a secular form, with a divine or mythological basis. 
That is, enlightenment reason was double-edged: it allowed the demystification of belief at 
the same time it established a form of secular transcendence, a realm beyond speculation 
and dispute--whether that was reason itself or God. These contradictory needs gave rise to 
what Altieri calls "lucidity," the need to restore the power of imagination to secular 
mythologies. Enlightenment reason gives rise to our present conflicts because it bequeaths 
to us a need to demystify ideals, but also the need for idealizing of a set of values that 
resists all demystification (Altieri, Self and Sensibility 12): 
Enlightenment thinkers wanted to preserve as many of 
the values sanctioned by religion as they could. This 
desire led them to create dual roles for their primary 
weapon--the ideal of reason. Reason could be wielded 
as an essentially critical instrument, seeking out and 
destroying structures of belief based on metaphor and 
superstitions only because reason also possessed positive 
values based in fact on the very Renaissance metaphoric 
system it was bent on destroying. (Altieri, Self and 
Sensibility 11) 
Reason, then, was a critical tool that was used to demystify systems based on superstition 
and belief; but it was also a fictional creation, an artificially constructed set of values taken 
as the tool with which the natural order of the cosmos was revealed. 
The secular form of an infusion of "organic" or imaginative values back into the 
aesthetic, the lyrical establishes the first-person experience as the source of authority and 
knowledge. But the lyrical also comes into conflict with enlightenment values, its 
skepticism of what cannot be empirically validated. The more the lyric values the personal, 
the romantic, the imaginative first-person account of experience, the more it conflicts with 
enlightenment emphasis on reason and objectivity. Modernism's need to defend the lyrical 
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against traditional representation, far from showing that the conflict between values of 
"reason" and "romance" has passed, demonstrates how present the terms of this debate 
are. More importantly, contemporary American poetry can still be read for the signs of this 
conflict, as Altieri points out: 
Once Enlightenment oppositions permeate our discourse 
about values, lyricism may be condemned to continual 
self-doubt. The models of what constitutes knowledge, 
or even what constitutes legitimate terms for discussing 
values, grow increasingly skeptical of what cannot be 
empirically demonstrated. Thus there is a constant 
temptation for poets to respond by rejecting impersonal 
thought and turning to the pure form of their myth, to 
the idea that it is only in terms of the intensity of first-
person experience that an authority for values can be 
established or defended. Yet once this move is made, 
there is no way even to talk about what the imagination 
discovers without bringing more doubts than clarity to 
what we would assert. (Self and Sensibility 13) 
We saw earlier how contemporary critics and poets argue against the need and value of 
theory, which, in light of Altieri' s remarks, leads us to understand their views as adhering 
to the need to defend the personal against the philosophical. Seeing critical theory and the 
philosophical poem as antithetical to the intensity of the first-person experience, segments 
of the poetic and critical communities reject "impersonal" (i.e., philosophical) thought as 
the only place where first-person authority and experience can be validated. However, as 
Altieri states, in turning more and more to the personal "intensity" of the first-person 
experience there is little ability for that "intensity" to be shared with others. 
The tensions resulting from the conflict between "rational" and "romantic" values 
and their different attitudes toward public and private experience are apparent in the way 
poets attempt to grapple with reconciling first and third-person attitudes toward the lyric 
self (Altieri, Self and Sensibility 16). The lyric self, the lyric "I" provides "our deepest 
model of a fully personal inwardness" (Altieri, Self and Sensibility 16). But the tensions 
between the sincerity of attempts to describe the self and the public rhetoric needed to 
communicate such a phenomena leave contemporary poets in a difficult position. "The 
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mystery, depth, immediacy, and essential privacy of our experiencing lyric emotions seems 
public testimony both to the uniqueness of private experience and to its ultimate 
communicability. If we can identify with what we read, we should be able to share similar 
experiences with those who participate in the same culture," says Altieri (Self and 
Sensibility 16). However, the very possibility of communication requires a dependency on 
a public discourse that seems a powerful invitation "to the ironic or deconstructive angel" 
(Altieri, Self and Sensibility 16). In other words, if "everything can be named in a public 
language, where does the "I" depart from the "he" or the "she," or where can we begin to 
present ourselves as unique by virtue of qualities of our subjective experience" (Altieri, Self 
and Sensibility 16)? 
The much-noticed use of pronouns in Ashbery's work evokes the difficulties of 
first-person intensity and its interaction with a public form of discourse. Ashbery often 
uses them loosely, with an indefiniteness of reference. "It" is a major word in the Ashbery 
oeuvre and it is a sign of "the poet's epistemological hesitance" (Fite 69), his hesitancy in 
postulating lasting forms of meaning. "It" is often used in Ashbery's poetry as a sign 
without a clear or certain referent. "It" is often vague, ill-defined, or lost among any 
number of possibilities: 
It is another life to the city, 
The backing of the looking glass of the 
Unidentified but precisely sketched studio. It wants 
To siphon off the life of the studio, deflate 
Its mapped space to enactments, island it. 
That operation has been temporarily stalled 
But something new is on the way, a new preciosity 
In the wind. Can you stand it, 
Francesco? Are you strong enough for it? 
This wind brings what it knows not, is 
Self-propelled, blind, has no notion 
Of itself. It is inertia that once 
Acknowledged saps all activity, secret or public .... 
If it dissolves now 
Into dust, that only means its time had come 
Some time ago, but look now, and listen: 
It may be that another life is stocked there 
In recesses no one knew of; that it, 
Not we, are the change; that we are in fact it 
If we could get back to it, relive some of the way 
It looked, tum our faces to the globe as it sets .... 
("Self-Portrait" 75-76) 
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At first the reader has a sense of referent for the "it" here, but it soon becomes obscured as 
the sentence passes through enjambment and further reference--as if the sense of "it" were 
not only large and undefined, but that "it" becomes an all-purpose category. "It" is 
sufficiently undefined so that it not only retains a sense of mystery, but the attribution also 
prevents any single form of meaning from emerging. "It," according to Fite, stands at a 
crucial place in Ashbery' s poetry, where randomness and meaningfulness commingle (71 ). 
"It" is a location where Ashbery's poetics of in-betweenness emerge, where the naming of 
meaning and the resistance to naming takes place: 
The details in which we see "it" manifest are all, in fact, 
metaphoric machinations for saying what is unsayable--
unsayable not because transcendent, but because immanent 
and ongoing through multifoliate particulars. "It" is an 
unessentialized naming of the flux, of that "doing" which 
involves "the whole fabric," and the name must be indefinite, 
must be itself a turning away from essence, because the 
implicit recognition is that any attempt to say "it," to give 
expression to the ongoingness of things, is inadequate. 
(Fite 71) 
"It" becomes a category without set or determined bounds. It names what cannot 
be named--Fites's "flux"--and as such suggests affinities both to the romantic ideal and the 
modernist order that were either always just out of reach or were to be discovered through 
art. However, in Ashbery, that ideal or order, the "it," is depicted as both always present 
on the surface of language and yet always receding before our very eyes. This is 
particularly clear throughout the poem as it alternates between the rhetoric of the self as 
pure surface and as never entirely present in and of itself. Regarding the mirror early on in 
the poem, the poet observes that "The time of day or the density of the light I Adhering to 
the face keeps it I Lively and intact in a recurring wave I Of arrival. The soul establishes 
itself' ("Self-Portrait" 68). The self in the portrait has a life, it is almost life-like in its 
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ability to represent a self, to make it present to the viewer. There seems to be no difficulty 
in taking the representation at "face-value," that is, it is what it appears to be. However, 
the poet realizes that the portrait is a portrait, and not only a portrait but a portrait of a 
reflection in a mirror--a representation of a reflection: 
But how far can it swim out through the eyes 
And still return safely to its nest? The surface 
Of the mirror being convex, the distance increases 
Significantly; that is, enough to make the point 
That the soul is a captive, treated humanely, kept 
In suspension, unable to advance much farther 
Than your look intercepts the picture. 
("Self-Portrait" 68) 
The self, now, suddenly becomes more difficult to see, becomes more the effect of 
representation than the soul itself. The soul in the painting, the poet realizes, is "a captive," 
part of the art and not the object itself. This is an important opposition within the poem and 
it reflects the struggle of contemporary poets with the dependencies of the "I" on a public 
discourse while testing strategies for expressing the distinctiveness of that subjectivity. 
Part of the dilemma this poem portrays, a dilemma which argues for its importance 
as a representative work of postmodernism, is how it grapples with the situation of 
attempting to forge new forms of expressing subjectivity--a situation that is complicated by 
the need to describe the subjective experience in a public language that does not reduce it to 
the conventions of public discourse. "Such balancing," says Altieri, "can involve complex 
redefinitions of how we understand the personal and impersonal, or the psychological and 
the rhetorical, as well as the possible interrelations among these poles" (Altieri, Self and 
Sensibility 16). This is the task that poets such as Ashbery accept as their own, an 
exploration of the continuing possibilities of the self that acknowledges its difficulties. 
That is, the desire for individuality and the desire to communicate public meaning run 
counter to each other. The desire to communicate, "the self projected as the vehicle for 
lyric experience" seeks a public identity, yet it can trust no public symbol or form as a 
vehicle for its distinctive qualities (Altieri, Self and Sensibility 22). Hence, the recourse 
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Ashbery has to the "it" which so often comes as a substitute for the "I" or the "we." Here, 
for instance, the fluidity between "it" and "we" is typical: 
It may be that another life is stocked there 
In recesses no one knew of; that it, 
Not we, are the change; that we are in fact it 
If we could get back to it .... 
("Self-Portrait" 76) 
What this viscous pronoun usage suggests, then, is that it arises from a romantic and/or 
modernist impulse that believes itself able to reveal an alternative order, but which, so it 
implies, is also beyond expression or the limits of our understanding. "It" is Ashbery's 
syntactical equivalent of the "divine" or the Whitmanian "self' in which all things are 
reflected. Ashbery' s pronouns, too, respond to the contemporary dilemma of being 
skeptical of the conventions of expression that place such "transcendent" ideals into static 
models. "Self-Portrait" reflects the desire to express a lyrical self, an "it," that is individual 
but does not have to depend on the past for models of subjective expression. The poet 
suggests that our dependence on others, on a public and shared discourse, is where the 
construction of self takes place: 
I think of the friends 
Who came to seem me, of what yesterday 
Was like. A peculiar slant 
Of memory that intrudes on the dreaming model 
In the silence of the studio as he considers 
Lifting the pencil to the self-portrait. 
How many people came and stayed a certain time, 
Uttered light or dark speech that became part of you 
Like light behind windblown fog and sand, 
Filtered and influenced by it, until no part 
Remains that is surely you. Those voices in the dusk 
Have told you all and still the tale goes on 
In the form of memories deposited in irregular 
Clumps of crystals. 
("Self-Portrait" 71) 
Note that it is not so much the poet or the artist--it could be either here--that constructs the 
self-portrait, but the others who talk about it. The "peculiar slant I Of memory" is 
important here in this respect; invoking Dickinson, the passage implies that her presence 
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has an influence on what it is that comes to be created as self. What she has had to say 
exerts its influence on what and how Ashbery the poet is able to create a version of 
subjectivity in the poem. The passages amplifies this idea as it states how the public 
discourse alters one's own version of subjective experience, "like light behind windblown 
fog and sand I Filtered and influenced by it," and leaves nothing that might be considered 
"I." Dependent on what has been said, the poet recognizes the fact that it is not so much 
what one wishes to express that gets spoken, but, instead, what is able to be expressed 
within a common public language. What has been said about self, the inherited ideas of 
self, these frame even the very possibility of saying "I" and determine its limits. It is not 
what an "I" has to say about self that gets expressed, but the understandings that are 
currently circulating about self. 
Recognizing the need of poetry to be both personal and sincere and also to 
acknowledge the public discourses and conventions through which the self is formed or 
described, Ashbery opens his poetry "to a play of tensions between the self represented 
and the variety of motives that go into the process of producing and using representations" 
(Altieri, Self and Sensibility 17). By opposing the notion of a "sincere" self, the one 
romantic poets posit as always beyond language, to the "artificial," rhetorical construction 
of self, Ashbery's "Self-Portrait" acts out a drama of the construction of self as poem. 
Ashbery plays on the opposition between the supposed "sincere" self beyond language and 
the rhetorical constructions of self in poetry. He plays on the opposition between sincerity 
and deception, sincerity as that which escapes expression in language and deception as that 
which shows the poet as an artificer. To foreground the rhetorical nature of self, to show 
"self' as always a construction, exposes the poet's secret: a desire for public significance 
while maintaining a deep, uninterpretable source of energy ensuring that the self does not 
simply become an actor on a public stage (Altieri, Self and Sensibility 24). Ashbery 
explores the interdependent nature of duplicity and sincerity in order to show that the 
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"representing self must share stage time with the dramatized actor playing his or her roles 
within a single constructed scene" (Self and Sensibility 17). 
Chapter Five 
Refracting Postmodernism 
In "Self-Portrait," then, we see an oblique stance towards literary tradition and 
history, an ambivalence towards romantic and modernist impulses, and an interrogation of 
the conventions of authorship and originality. Because of Ashbery' s deflation of tradition, 
his purging of the idealized forms of authorship and originality, and his undermining of 
humanistic notions of poetry and subjectivity, it is little wonder he is so associated with 
postmodern aesthetic practices. However clear these practices might appear, though, the 
poem's ambivalence and undecidedness towards them makes it more difficult to situate the 
poem conveniently within the postmodernist genre. While Ashbery' s pastiche of the 
cultural and aesthetic past suggests an affinity with American versions of postmodernism, 
that easy attribution also overlooks the poet's own uneasy relationship with such a 
categorization. Quite often Ashbery' s poetry is determined by a relationship with the 
aesthetic past that divests the work of "high" art of its aura, while also reinforcing the 
divide between high and popular culture that postmodernism supposedly works to 
undermine. In order to get the joke of Ashbery's poetry, in other words, it is necessary to 
know what it is so often parodies: aesthetic modernism. "Self-Portrait," working to 
undermine the aesthetic idealism of modernism, predicates itself on two contradictory 
strains of modernism: the high modernist tradition which, providing idealized images to be 
purged of transcendental value, also maintains the distinction between itself and the 
popular; and the late-modernist or postmodern refraction of that distinction which mingles 
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the high and the popular. Postmodemism, then, contains no simple relation to the aesthetic 
past, but is made up of conflicting impulses: while distancing itself from the past through 
demystification and juxtaposition, it must retain that past as making the present possible. 
This ambivalent tension serves more to reinforce the distinction between the high and the 
popular than to undermine it. It also prevents any untroubled identification of Ashbery as 
postmodern. 
Andreas Huyssen's book, After the Great Divide, characterizes the postmodemism 
of the 1970s as having been constituted by the same conflicting strains of modernism that 
appear in Ashbery's work. There is, in this version of postmodemism, "an ever wider 
dispersal and dissemination of artistic practices all working out of the ruins of the 
modernist edifice, raiding it for ideas, plundering its vocabulary and supplementing it with 
randomly chosen images and motifs from pre-modem and non-modem cultures as well as 
from contemporary mass culture" (196). Modernist styles, Huyssen adds, were abolished, 
but continued as part of mass culture. This appropriation of modernist images from a 
"cultural storage bank," making the whole history of various artistic techniques, forms, and 
images stored and available for instant recall, marks the crossing of Huyssen' s "great 
divide": that between high modernism and mass culture. It is a divide that no longer seems 
relevant to postmodern aesthetic sensibilities, says Huyssen (197). The problem, then, of 
situating Ashbery as a late modem or a postmodern is complicated by an aesthetic culture 
and ideology that has largely abandoned the distinction between "mass" and "high" culture. 
However, while Ashbery often obscures these sorts of distinctions, he also retains the 
highly sophisticated philosophical subjects of modernism. It is his continuing 
philosophical engagement with modernist issues that seems so problematic in assigning 
him a postmodern status. Ashbery' s engagement with modernism suggests not so much an 
affiliation with postmodemism as much as it does with the aesthetic forms and intellectual 
concerns of modernism. 
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Part of the "New York School," Ashbery was not only a part of the scene that 
included such American modernist movements as Abstract Expressionism, but, more 
poignantly, was even part of the established "institutions" of high art. An editor for Art 
News and a reviewer for the Herald Tribune in France, Ashbery is clearly associated with 
what Andreas Huyssen observes to be that cultural moment in the 1950s and early 1960s 
when modernism entered the mainstream. This moment marks, says Huyssen, the 
emergence for the first time of something that can be considered "institution art." The irony 
in this institutional status for modernism was that it had sought to resist the sort of 
bourgeois cooption into marketability and commodification that it suddenly found itself 
subject to during the 1950s and early 1960s (Huyssen 193). Part of this moment that saw 
the "institutionalization" of modernism, Auden's early identification of Ashbery as being 
the heir of Rimbaud (Bloom 49-50) is significant because it shows the emerging 
development of a perception of him as aligned with the "high" art tradition of modernism 
and not with the more "populist," resistant strains of avant-garde in the late 1950s and early 
1960s. 
The "pop" culture that developed later in the 1960s, Huyssen notes, was part of an 
attempt to recapture the "adversary ethos" that was so much a part of modernism in its 
earlier stages, but which had been lost in its "institutionalization." Ashbery's relationship 
with this "adversarial" culture and art was primarily shaped by his place within the 
traditional "institutions" of high art. His interests and aesthetics clearly reflect an on-going 
preoccupation with modernism as much as a fascination with the popular. It is from within 
his position within the institutional forms of modernism that Ashbery's relationship toward 
the more resistant varieties of culture was formed. As Ashbery says of a painter he 
reviewed in Art News, but applicable to himself as well, "his own work is constantly 
undergoing changes which take new esthetic developments into account, without 
necessarily conforming to them" (Ashbery, "Absence and Illusion" 33). Although he 
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embraced aspects of "pop" art that were popularized in the late 1960s, there is very little 
sense in which we can see him as a "popular" poet. His poetry is, quite often, dense and 
opaque, difficult and obscure, largely because of the intellectual paradigms and aesthetics 
he makes use of. However, associated with this "high" philosophical subject matter 
Ashbery uses to construct his poems is the "low" to which these highs are brought, as if to 
show the limits of such aesthetic ambitions. This, it seems, is the more "populist" gesture 
in Ashbery, using popular culture as a means of demystifying and ironizing the 
epistemological claims of modernist aesthetic idealism. For example, in comments on 
Picasso made in Art News in 1971, Ashbery mingles a traditional homage to high 
modernist aesthetics with the pop culture of commercial jingle: 
And Picasso still continues to chum out brilliant, marvelous, 
incredible pictures with a vitality that has to be compared 
to some natural force like the sun or tides. We, his public, 
are not unduly amazed when natural forces continue to perform 
as they have in the past. And we are better able to contemplate 
our own aging thanks to his exemplary fertility: vicariously, 
we can live a little better. To paraphrase a currently ubiquitous 
soft-drink commercial: we've got a lot to live, and Pablo's 
got a lot to give. ("Picasso at 90" 68) 
The "natural force" of Picasso's "fertility" is brought low by its association with an 
advertisement for a soft-drink. The mystery of Picasso's "vitality" is summed up in a 
jingle. Ashbery sets up and then prevents the idealistic language from proceeding too far, 
retaining the idealism but commodifying it, bringing it to the level of a popular slogan. It is 
as if the inspiration of modernism, its "natural force," is denied any ability to leave the 
plane of the popular. We see this impulse, as well, in a later article where Ashbery draws a 
parallel between the techniques of abstract-expressionism and a comic strip: 
There was once a Mutt and Jeff strip in which Jeff had 
gone into business selling honey with a dead bee in each 
jar as a proof of genuineness and frantic brushwork is 
often the dead bee in Abstract-Expressionist painting. 
("Absence and Illusion" 33) 
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Looking at modernism through popular culture, Ashbery' s equating the brushwork of 
Abstract Expressionism to Mutt and Jeff's dead bee undermines the use-value of the 
"genuine." It questions the need for it, wonders if it actually does any good at all. 
Two aspects, then, of Ashbery's relationship to modernism are important. First, he 
is much more clearly associated with a "mainstream" culture of modernism and its 
institutional forms than with a resistant or adversarial form of the avant-garde or popular 
culture; and, second, while not a "populist" poet, Ashbery intermingles "high" and "low" 
cultures through a juxtaposition of what we might call "low" aesthetic form and "high" 
philosophical subject. Both of these aspects allow us to see more clearly how "Self-
Portrait" and Ashbery fit the cultural moment of a 1970s postmodernism that now looks to 
us much more like a version of modernism. 
What is most difficult about an unequivocal attribution of Ashbery's post-
modernism is that his residual idealism is more in agreement with modernism than it is with 
the aesthetic leveling of postmodernism. Huyssen is helpful on this point. He notes that 
the association of postmodernism and poststructuralism, almost a commonplace in 
academic discussions, is not as clear cut as might appear. Instead, he says, post-
structuralism, to a significant degree, is a theory of modernism (207). 
If it is true that postmodernity is a historical condition 
making it sufficiently unique and different from modernity, 
then it is striking to see how deeply the poststructuralist 
critical discourse--in its obsession with ecriture and writing, 
allegory and rhetoric, and in its displacement of revolution 
and politics to the aesthetic--is embedded in that very 
modernist tradition which, at least in American eyes, it 
presumably transcends. (Huyssen 207-208) 
According to Huyssen, it is the aesthetic idealism, the faith in textuality, the privileging of 
writing, that reveals poststructuralism' s closer affinity to modernism, not postmodernism. 
Modernism's aesthetic innovation and experiment, its self-reflexiveness, its purging of 
reality and history from art, its insight that the subject is constituted in language--these all 
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create a new version of the autonomy of art. An art for art's sake view, the poststructural 
version of modernism abandons faith in art's potential to change the world. It is in valuing 
these refracted and selective characteristics of modernism that poststructuralism elaborates 
not a theory of postmodernism, but modernism. 
The selective reading poststructuralism does of modernism creates a modernism "of 
playful transgression, of an unlimited weaving of textuality, a modernism all confident in 
its rejection of representation and reality, in its denial of the subject, of history, and of the 
subject of history" (Huyssen 209). It is a very different modernism than the modernism of 
negativity and alienation. It is as if the critique of bourgeois modernism and modernization 
has not only been jettisoned from the modernist project, but its self-incurred responsibilities 
"to change life, change society, change the world" (Huyssen 210) are now seen as deluded 
attempts that stepped beyond the realm of art. It is as if in the poststructural version of 
modernism those visions of influencing the world through art have been abandoned in 
favor of a retreat into an aestheticism of writing. But as Huyssen says of post-
structuralism' s promotion of ecriture, it not only reaffirms the divide between popular and 
high culture, it is also a sign of the inconsistencies of contemporary critical thought. In its 
attempts to pass off a regenerated version of modernism as the latest avant-garde in 
criticism or poetry, poststructuralism tries to salvage what it has sought to distance itself 
from: 
To insist on the adversary function of ecriture and of 
breaking of linguistic codes when every second ad 
bristles with domesticated avantgardist and modernist 
strategies strikes me as caught precisely in that very 
overestimation of art's transformative function for 
society which is the signature of an earlier, modernist, 
age. (Huyssen 210) 
Finding it rather absurd that poststructuralism tries to pass off a selective version of 
modernism as the latest avant-garde in aesthetics and criticism, Huyssen questions "the 
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notion of a radical rupture between the modem and the postmodern ... " (208). This lack 
of rupture where one is often predicated is most apparent in the sort of work attempted by 
poststructuralist criticism, says Huyssen, particularly in its emphasis on modernist, not 
postmodernist, works of literature or art: 
It is furthermore striking that despite the considerable 
differences between the various poststructuralist projects, 
none of them seems informed in any substantial way by 
postmodernist works of art. Rarely, if ever, do they 
even address postmodernist works. In itself, this does 
not vitiate the power of the theory. But it does make for 
a kind of dubbing where the poststructuralist language is 
not in sync with the lips and movements of the postmodern 
body. There is no doubt that center stage in critical theory 
is held by the classical modernists: Flaubert, Proust and 
Bataille in Barthes; Nietzsche and Heidegger, Mallarme and 
Artaud in Derrida; Nietzsche, Magritte and Bataille in 
Foucault; Mallarme and Lautreamont, Joyce and Artaud in 
Kristeva; Freud in Lacan; Brecht in Althusser and Machrey, 
and so on ad infinitum. The enemies still are realism and 
representation, mass culture and standardization, grammar, 
communication, and the presumably all-powerful homogenizing 
pressures of the modem State. (Huyssen 208-209) 
Ashbery's own poetic project is very similar to the sorts of readings the post-
structuralists undertake of modernism. His accommodation to poststructuralist readings 
during the 1970s and 1980s attests to the easy interface between the theory of 
poststructuralism--as a theory of modemism--and the practice of his poetics. Ashbery fits 
into a view of postmodemism as modernism in his critique of realism and representation, 
originality and authorship, while maintaining a residual aesthetic idealism, an attempt to 
salvage aesthetic modernism--the privilege and idealism reserved for an aesthetics of 
writing. Ashbery retains a faith in the poetic imagination and, most importantly, in writing 
itself as an artistic medium able to fashion unique and profound insights--no matter how 
fleeting and transitory these might be. Ashbery has certainly abandoned the sorts of 
modernist "visions" of aesthetic idealism that sought to change the world, but this reduction 
of the "transformative power of art" to a game, an endless source of possibilities, marks 
Ashbery as being much closer to what Huyssen identifies as a typically 1970s model of 
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(post)modernism--a version of modernism preoccupied with the aesthetics of writing as a 
retreat from those earlier "visionary" modernisms. It is in this particular affirmation of 
aesthetic idealism that the divide between popular culture and the high culture of modernism 
reinsinuates itself within a refracted version of modernism and contributes to the placement 
of Ashbery in the context of a 1970s (post)modernism more closely resembling a late 
version of modernism. 
John Ashbery's "Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror," then, is an important textual 
indicator of the sorts of changes that have taken place within contemporary theory and 
poetry in the last thirty years. The poem is an artifact of the impulses and ideas that have 
revised our ways of talking about such things as literature. Ostensibly postmodern, 
Ashbery's poem problematizes the sorts of arbitrary distinctions and idealistic motives that 
have traditionally informed aesthetic production, undermining them, subverting them, 
restlessly building and destroying them. Erasing the sharp distinction between poetic and 
theoretical discourses, the poem shares the postmodern milieu in which such distinctions 
are shown to be the result of political exclusions and conscious choices--not necessarily the 
value-free, "objective" decisions they have so often been made out to be. Foregrounding 
the aesthetic choices and exclusions that are always being made in art, the poem resembles 
a poeticized theoretical discourse. It is self-consciously theoretical, particularly as it seems 
to share the cultural preoccupation with what it means to represent human consciousness. 
That is, taking as its subject the nature of representing the human consciousness, the poem 
engages with postmodern theory, shares its view of the human subject as the creation of 
both language and ideology. 
What is particularly striking is the manner in which the poem's revision of the 
subject is paralleled by the same sorts of revisions within academia. At roughly the same 
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time as Ashbery is undertaking his own revision of the subject, postmodern theory is 
beginning to have an impact upon the structure and discourse of the university. 
Questioning the divisions and distinctions of knowledge that constitute the institution of the 
university, postmodern theory has opened up new varieties of discursive practices, 
practices that have made possible interactions among disciplines that have not historically 
been associated. 
Within the division of literature itself, there has been a massive undertaking to show 
how "constructed" its subject is. Studies like Graff's Professing Literature share the 
postmodern preoccupation for revisiting the past in order to show how what has so often 
been represented as stable, coherent, and transhistorical has actually been carefully 
constructed to suit political and social contingencies. As a representation of the human 
subject, literature itself, which historically has been requisitioned to show the trans-
historical essence of "man's" nature, is finding itself under increasingly skeptical 
interrogations about what ethical values can or should be conjoined with particular aesthetic 
readings. While equally politicized, postmodern revisions of the stability and coherence of 
the subject of literature attempt, at least, to foreground their readings as always political, as 
always ideologically motivated. 
The traditional distinction between theory and poetry is itself highly politicized. 
Within literature, the divisions between theorists and poets remain a constant reminder that 
there are always competing versions of what literature is or should be about. But what is 
most useful in postmodern theory and poetry is how it attempts to revise our understanding 
of just this kind of binary opposition. By showing how "constructed" and arbitrary the 
distinction is between theory and poetry, by taking apart the differences between them, 
postmodernism indicates that it is more useful to examine their relationships and 
interactions. Ashbery's "Self-Portrait" is valuable, then, not simply as an artifact of this 
climate, an indication of its impulses and practices, but as an enactment of the erasure of 
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arbitrary distinctions, distinctions less useful when placed in mutual opposition and much 
more useful when able to interact freely. As Ashbery demonstrates, the results of such 
interactions indicate both our need for them, our continued dependence on them, and the 
restrictions they contain us within. It is Ashbery' s mingling of conflicting strains of 
inherited discursive, ideological, and aesthetic practices that is, finally, most remarkable. 
"Self-Portrait," acting as a stage, allows competing impulses and vocabularies to neutralize 
and cancel each other out, pointing to both the inadequacy of past formulations and the 
uncertainty of the not yet--leaving us only the present. 
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